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Abstract 
In an increasing number of Organizations for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, the 
quality of hospital care has been subject to various forms of health policies. Despite much research on the 
determinants of health care quality, there is no consensus on the underlying factors of health care quality. This thesis 
contributes to the previous works by analyzing the relationship between hospital competition and quality of care by 
using data in the areas of health care outcome and utilization measures, which rarely have been examined together. 
This thesis also uses a comprehensive measure of hospital competition in connection with the analysis of country level 
data for OECD countries. The results give robust support for the hypothesis that hospital competition leads to 
improved outcome of hospital care measured in mortality and length of hospital stay. Results suggest that as the 
competition intensifies, hospitals are likely to be able to reduce health care mortality. These findings are also 
confirmed for public and mixed models of a health care system. The evidence that greater competition leads to lower 
length of hospital stay is partly supported by the data. On the one hand controlling for the heterogeneity in the health 
care systems with country-specific dummy variables leads to lower length of hospital stay. On the other hand 
controlling countries in the mixed model of a health care system there is evidence in favor of positive association 
between length of hospital stay and hospital competition but negative association for countries included in the public 
health care system. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This chapter begins with a review of the background information on the effect of competition on health 
care quality in hospitals. First, the chapter will review the background on the theory and evidence on the 
issue and in relation to measures of health care quality and hospital competition. Second, the chapter will 
describe the role of hospital competition in relation to the current reforms in countries within Organization 
for Economic Co-Operation and Development. Third, the chapter also discusses the difficulty of finding 
appropriate measures for hospital competition that would be applicable for public and private hospital 
markets.  It then presents the aim of the research and limitation of the data collection model and the two 
research questions this thesis endeavors to explore.  
 
 
 
1.1 Background 
 
As the influence of hospital competition on the quality of care has been an important issue in the area of 
health care research for several decades (Chen & Cheng, 2010; Ginsburg, 2005; Propper, Burgess & Green, 
2004; Giuffrida, Gravelle & Roland, 1999; Kessler & Geppert, 2005), the actual magnitude of the gains 
from hospital competition is still very much an open debate. To be precise, much of the focus of this debate 
is being aimed at the potential qualitative effects from hospital competition owed to improved productivity 
and performance of hospital providers (Bowers, Swan & Koehler, 1994; Cowing, Davino-Ramaya, Ramaya 
& Szmerekovsky, 2009). Another effect of hospital competition is, however, often overseen; the increase of 
hospital competition is likely to follow for different hospital markets in the public and private sectors such 
that the effects are likely to reflect differences in stages of development towards hospital competition that 
could be comparable in for-profit, not-for-profit, private and public hospital markets. This idea has led 
researchers to question whether the promotion of hospital competition is based on empirical evidence that 
is consistent with positive relation of hospital performance with the quality of health care (FTC, 2004; 
Giuffrida, Gravelle & Roland, 1999).  
 
It is important to establish definitions of hospital competition and quality of care and to describe 
background for the promotion of hospital competition in the framework of health care policy development. 
First, what is meant by hospital competition is the high level of performance of hospital providers in the 
provision of health care whereas the health care quality is the desired health outcome for treated patients. 
Second, the relationship between health care quality and hospital competition is expected to exist, due to 
the possible spillover effects on the hospital quality when hospital performance improves. Third, the 
advantage from hospital competition comes from reduced demographic transitions that are likely to come 
into force in the form of future rising health care expenditures. This means the promotion of hospital 
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competition there is a desire to impede the rise in health care expenditure that would affect preferable 
outcome for health care quality. Finally, the reformations of public hospitals have been the dominant 
structural trend under the current health policies directed towards downsizing and consolidation of hospital 
services in the public sector. This policy to the public sector is prevalent for the developed countries within 
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) which have had framework for 
inter-state cooperation motivated primarily by the increase in country‟s health care expenditures caused by 
demographic transitions (OECD, 2012; Blanchette & Tolley, 1997). This framework is associated with 
primarily public-private partnerships that represent new way to deliver health care services targeting 
possible future health outcomes in the OECD (Espigares & Torres, 2009; Curristine, Lonti & Joumard, 
2007). Moreover, as there has been a widespread demographic transition in the OECD it becomes even 
more desirable to pursue development cooperation in the area of health care policy as the outcome of 
hospital quality tends to undermine governments‟ efforts to improve the quality of care when countries are 
allocating greater share of their GDP in the finding of health care (OECD, 2011; Xu, Saksena & Holly, 
2011).  
 
This study draws in the theory of “economic model of a hospital,” first introduced by Newhouse in the 
1970. This theory signified an improved understanding of the significance of hospital performance and its 
possible effect on the quality of care by arguing that hospitals aim to maximize both quality and quantity 
constraints of their services subject to financial incentives and constraints (Newhouse, 1970; Morris, 
Devlin, Nancy, Parkin & David, 2003). This conceptual framework offers reasonable structure of analysis 
to approach hospital performance and quality of care within the context of managerial decisions that tend to 
balance various services provided in hospitals (Morris, Devlin, Nancy & Parkin, 2003). Even so, it seems 
to be relevant to use the theory in the health policy environment that requires hospitals in different hospital 
markets to promote the development of competitive solutions allocated by managerial decisions with focus 
on future quality improvements (OECD, 2013; OECD, 2012). The hospitals are then able to improve health 
care quality when they improve operational capacity and thereby insure better utilization of hospital 
services and lower excess capacity (Devers, Brewster & Casalino, 2003; Morris et al., 2003). 
 
As far as the research has shown to date there does not seem to be any international studies in the field of 
Health Service Research (HSR). Most studies have used regional data but there appears to be very little if 
none at the international level. At the same there seems to be a link between hospital competition and 
quality of care due to the intensification in the health care reforms process aimed towards improved 
hospital performance (Curristine et al., 2007). Therefore, the international study aims to contribute to the 
current state of knowledge regarding the future impact of health care policies by filling the gap of research 
at the regional level as there is little agreement of the benefits of increased competition in the health care 
quality.  Moreover, evidence outlines that an empirical analysis needs to be developed further by 
combining new approaches and possible measures towards hospital quality (Arah, Klaziga, Delnoij, Ten 
Asbroek & Custers, 2003; Chow-Chua & Goh, 2002). This means that the assessment of quality of care and 
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hospital competition requires incorporating performance related measures in the approach to hospital 
competition that might be relevant in different health care systems (Arah et al., 2003). The performance 
related measures are not completely determined by the previous research since the methods used vary 
greatly. Moreover, the use of health system-related indicators themselves is complicated since this often 
entails developing an operational definition of quality with the view to allow the establishment of health 
care monitoring practices (Arah et al., 2003). This preposition seems to be in line with the economic model 
of a hospital that suggests that hospitals appear to be aiming to maximize both the quantity and quality 
domains of their services. In relation to this, the thesis intends contribute to the research at the regional 
level by arguing that hospital performance needs to be approached within the framework of hospital 
management decisions with regard to hospitals‟ operational capacity, outcome of hospital treatment and 
financial incentives of different health care systems. In order to control for health care system differences 
this study will follow the example of Bjegović and Donev (2004), who developed a model for separating 
countries according to their health care system characteristics, that is, the public and mixed models. 
 
In the previous papers, most results are obtained by using quantitative methods of analysis and health 
system related factors to determine the interaction between, most commonly, health insurance coverage and 
quality of care in the context of hospital competition. While, the health-system related factors are relevant 
to the outcomes of health care quality, for instance, the type of insurance, they have an effect on how the 
health care service is organized.  Empirical studies do not seem to capture the context of the methods used. 
For example, the empirical evidence has indicated that while the increased hospital competition may help 
to reduce costs the relationship between hospital competition and health care quality is complicated by the 
prevailing differences in the health care insurance coverage, price regulation and for-profit status (Bijlsma, 
Koning, Shestalova & Aouragh, 2010; Volpp, Ketchman & Town, 2003; Epstein & Williams, 2005; 
Excarce, Jain & Rogowski, 2006). Studies in the United States, for instance, have used regional data in 
private hospital settings and have pointed out that Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) influences the 
way hospital competition effects the quality by distinguishing an HMO and Managed Care plans as one of 
the key factors that influence hospital‟s competition effect on the quality of care (Gowrisankaran & Town, 
2003; Escarce, Jain & Rogowski, 2006; Mukamel, Zwangziger & Tomaszewski, 2001). In regards to 
hospital market, these studies seemingly state, nothing about how the quality of care is impacted from 
hospital competition in the public hospital sector where the extent of hospital competition is limited. 
Moreover, there appears to be a lack of consensus on the part of the evidence and papers on the English 
National Health Service (NHS). Propper, Burgess and Green (2004) disclose negative relations between 
health care quality and hospital competition when assessing patient‟s travel times in hospitals catchment 
areas as measure of hospital competition. Similarly, Liu and Pheleps (2008) established negative relation in 
the case of managed care plans when assessing non-price competition whereas Gowrisankaran and Town 
(2003) and Mukamel, Zwangziger and Tomaszewski (2001) found positive relation for HMO insured 
patients and  Escarce, Jain and Rogowski (2006) for less HMO insurance. In addition to the little agreement 
in the empirical studies creates an impediment to establishment of country level measurement approaches 
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that will aid in the assessment of recent health care development in the public sector. 
 
In this thesis I argue that an increase in hospital competition provides a prerequisite for positive effects on 
health care quality regardless of the setting of hospital market as competitiveness triggered by policies to 
improve performance seems to increase the overall pressure to improve hospital services. There are several 
arguments to this point. First, many countries in the OECD have already identified priorities in relation to 
best practice used by implementing market-related policies which means firstly the reinforcement of 
competitiveness between health providers and insurers and secondly the information and choice available 
for patients in different hospitals (OECD, 2012; Propper & Dixon, 2011). Second, governments within 
OECD countries by having followed development with respect to English NHS reforms in hospital markets 
became increasingly involved in sustaining innovative ways to improve public sector efficiency by 
partnering with the private sector. This comes from the increased effort to diminish the excess capacity in 
the public hospitals (Bloom, Propper, Seiler & Reen, 2010; Curristine, Lonti & Joumard, 2007; Taylor & 
Blair, 2002). The underlying reason for this is that according to current state of knowledge the public-
private partnerships play an important role in improving the viability of public hospitals and thus the 
quality of hospital services (Taylor & Blair, 2002). It has triggered the development of hospital competition 
with both overlapping tendencies among different hospital markets and with focus on the development 
within a hospital. In light of these health care policy reforms, it seems reasonable to question to what extent 
hospital competition actually affect the quality of care in the policy environment that demands innovative 
ways to improve quality and that also tends to overlap with differences in the health-system related factors 
across countries. 
 
The mechanism of health care policies in different hospital markets are affected in the following ways. A 
number of OECD countries have faced the challenge of accomplishing both higher quality and greater 
efficiency in the health care use among different sectors of hospital market (Jiang, Friedman & Begun, 
2006). To improve the competitive climate between different hospitals the market-based reforms are 
designed to create financial incentives for health care providers to improve hospital performance among 
both the public and private hospital types (Cooper, Gibbons & Jones, 2012; Gaynor & Town, 2011). First, 
the idea is to increase competitive pressure in public hospitals and simultaneously enhance competitive 
efforts further in the privately owned specialty hospitals (Cooper, Gibbons & Jones, 2012; Gaynor & 
Town, 2011). Particularly, the policies aimed at sustaining the scope of competition for patients through the 
expansion of opportunities for patient choice and lower waiting times (Ettelt, 2007). Second, the expansion 
of competition among the large public hospitals should be pursued for the purpose of creating greater 
efficiency in the use of the health care services. Finally, measures are aimed at sustaining the competitive 
environment between privately-owned specialty hospitals. That is to say, health care reforms are aimed at 
both private and public sectors of hospital market in the number of OECD countries.  
 
Due to recent health care developments there seems to be a problem with finding the appropriate measure 
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for hospital competition in the public sector. Empirical studies that have used regional data were 
predominantly focused on the hospital market structure that is distinguished by the private hospital 
arrangement. In these studies the problem seems to have been the reluctance to develop new operational 
measure for hospital competition that is distinctly different from Herfindahl-Hirchman Index (HHI) that is 
used as hospital market shares (Chen & Cheng, 2010; Gaynor, 2007). There are several arguments for the 
relevance of the measures that are used in the private hospitals.  First, the argument is that, due to the 
extended role of private hospital sector, governments are justified in their attempt to increase private 
participation in public hospitals which is expected to result in better public sector performance (Taylor & 
Blair, 2002). As such, the public-private arrangements are intended to bring about more private sector 
efficiency into public hospitals (Curristine, Lonti & Joumard, 2007; Taylor & Blair, 2002). Second, the 
great share of research seems to be concentrated on markets with more developed private hospital 
arrangements.  That means that measuring hospital competition often occurs in areas with legally enforced 
hospital competition while the impact of the reforms has been targeting primarily the hospital quality in the 
public sector. As a result, empirical research seems to be complicated by the prevailing difficulty to 
establish complete comprehension of the effect of current health care policies in different hospital markets. 
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1.2 Aim and Purpose 
 
 
The idea of health care policy reforms is to generate quality improvements in health care by the use of 
competitive strategies in public and private sectors in an increasing number of OECD countries. The spread 
of health care policy measures promotes the development in the hospital market and is considered 
important for many countries struggling to improve the efficiency of health care services. With the 
introduction of free choice of health care providers, health care policy reforms are able to target the greater 
use of competitive strategies among the publicly owned hospitals in order to accomplish continuous 
improvement in health care quality (Brekke, 2011). As Brekke (2011) and Tailor and Blair (2002) point out 
these reforms are aimed to increase the scope of competition in general and in public hospitals in particular.  
One approach is to reward efficiency in the performance of hospitals.  In relation to this, hospitals in the 
U.K are paid a tariff for each treated patient, which is known as compensation granted to hospitals if 
hospitals manage to increase their patient base. This result-oriented approach has also been developed in 
the early reform period as a response to increase cost-effectiveness in the public sector (Curristane, Lonti & 
Jourmard, 2007). Similar measures have been instigated in Norway, Denmark, Italy, Netherlands and 
several other countries (Brekke, 2011).  The use of the performance-based measures in health care suggest 
that hospitals in number of OECD countries have come under increasing pressure to improve the quality of 
their health care services by use of similar strategies. 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to contribute to the understanding of the existing empirical literature by 
clarifying whether or not greater competition among hospitals contribute to ways to improve services in the 
policy environment that requires greater quality of care (Tailor & Blair, 2002; Cooper, Gibbons & Jones, 
2012). To conduct the empirical analysis of hospital competition the study adopts a measure that is 
different from the measure of HHIs for hospital market shares that were overwhelmingly used in the 
regional research (Propper, Burgess & Green, 2004; Mukamel, Zwanziger & Tomaszewski, 2001; Chen & 
Cheng, 2010; Keeler, Melnick & Zwanziger, 1999; Krishnan, 2001; Town, Wholey, Feldman & Burns, 
2007; Gaynor, 2007; Noether, 1988). That is, the study adopts the density measure on the total number of 
hospitals in the population for OECD countries available at the country level. The study motivates the use 
of density measures is that they are insensitive to a certain variation in the hospital market appropriate in 
the assessment of heterogeneous OECD hospital market development (Gresenz, Rogowski & Escarce, 
2004; Morris, Devlin & Parkin, 2003). In addition to that, the use of density measures is also motivated by 
that greater quantity of hospital providers has a tendency to increase pressures for hospitals to improve its 
services and attract patients‟ demand (Ecevit, Ciftci & Ag, 2010). To control for the unobserved country 
heterogeneity in the hospital market development the study uses also country dummy variables. In relation 
to the outcome of health care quality hospital mortality is chosen because it measures undesirable health 
outcome for patients related to hospital internal failures. Considering the use of health care services the 
length of hospital stay is an appropriate measure because it allows accounting for source that contributes to 
lower excess capacity influencing health care quality in the process of health service improvements (Morris 
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et al., 2003; Devers, Brewster & Casalino, 2003). The two indicators are then related in this study since 
them both measure cases for the disease known as acute myocardial infarction (AMI) as the leading cause 
of death (McLafferty, 2003).  
 
 
1.2 Limitations 
 
There are two specific limitations in this thesis. First is, because there were missing time periods the 
researcher needed to estimate values and it would have been preferable to have the data available for this 
rather than using the estimated values. Second is, that the data has less years and it would have been 
preferable to have longer time periods whereas the data used is on average between  2002-2009.  
 
 
1.4  Research questions 
 
 
 
The thesis aims to examine the following questions: 
 
 
1. To what extent is health care quality influenced by hospital competition among health care 
providers in the OECD countries?  
 
2. In what way does hospital competition affect the quality of services, given the differences in the 
reimbursement levels and health care systems in different countries?  
 
 
1.5 Summary  
This chapter has underlined the importance of hospital competition in the health care reform process that 
targets improvements in the quality of care. It has argued that hospital competition plays an important role 
for improving the quality of hospital care but their effect is far from being determined completely by the 
previous empirical studies. The underlying difficulty lies in establishing appropriate measurement 
approaches. Furthermore, the overwhelming evidence is concentrated on measuring competition in private 
hospital arrangements while the impact on hospital services target the quality in the public sector. Later, the 
chapter points out that in some OECD countries hospitals have used similar health care policies to improve 
the performance of their hospital care, such as patient-choice and compensation for increasing patient base 
in hospitals in different hospital types.  Therefore, the study intends to clarify its measurement approach for 
different hospital markets and use a density measure for hospital competition that is insensitive to a certain 
variation in the hospital market and is seemingly different from the market share measures that are 
commonly used in the research at the regional level.  
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2 Literature Review  
 
 
This chapter begins with the review of the literature of the previous empirical studies that have assessed the 
effect of hospital competition on health care quality. First, the chapter will give an account on the 
contribution of the previous research and present their measures and methods used in relation to the 
estimation of quality and hospital competition. Further, the section will also argue for the relevance of 
approaching quality measures in relation to outcome-based and utilization-based measures that highlight 
different aspects of health care quality in hospitals. Finally, the following two sections will provide a 
review of empirical studies that have used similar measures to those related to the outcome-based and 
utilization-based measures of health care quality. 
 
 
2.1 Empirical studies 
 
Competition between hospitals plays an important role in the delivery and financing of health care. 
Empirical studies in the U.S., for example, have had a very strong focus on the hospital competition within 
their counties (Noether, 1988; Keeler, Melnick & Zwanziger, 1999; Krishnan, 2001; Town, Wholey, 
Feldman & Burns, 2007; Chen & Cheng 2010; Gaynor, 2007). From these studies, there appears to be a 
strong correlation between hospital competition and health care quality. These studies tend to measure 
hospital competition by the sum of squared market share for all hospitals included in their counties.  It 
means, they show hospital competition by using the market share and calculating the number of hospital 
discharges divided by the total discharge rate in a given market area (Chen & Cheng, 2010). How to 
measure the hospital competition is a subject of disagreement in the empirical studies (Garnick et al., 
1987). Sometimes hospital competition is measured by county level data that shows a reduced mortality 
rate among AMI patients (Kessler, 2000). Due to the different ways of calculating hospital competition, it 
seems to be difficult to know exactly how to measure hospital competition and the effect on quality.  
 
The previous studies on the health care quality and hospital competition have used the in-hospital mortality 
rates and hospital length of stay as a measure of health care quality (Morales, Peters & Afessa, 2003; 
Tetteroo, Vagenvoort, Mulder, Ince & Bruining, 1993; Finkielman, Morales, Peters, Keegan, Ensminger & 
Lymp, 2004). Tetteroo et al. (1993), for instance, find that there is a correlation between decreased 
mortality and length of hospital stay for patients with surgical intensive care which implies that shorter 
length of stay and decreased mortality both have similar effect when outcome of hospital care and 
performance of hospitals improve simultaneously. Likewise, Morales et al., (2003) also find that night 
admissions are associated with lower mortality rates and shorter hospital stay. Finkielman et al. (2004) 
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finds that, when patient face more intensive treatments patient admissions do not lead to mortality increases 
or an increase in the hospital stay.   
 
Quality measures can be classified into two different types of measures. The first is outcome based 
indicators and then second is utilization-based indicators. There are some differences between the outcome 
indicators and utilization indicators in measuring quality of care. The outcome-based indicators measure 
the outcome-related factors associated with patient‟s health status. The utilization-based indicators, 
however, are associated with the level of health care quality. In contrast to the outcome indicators of health 
care, the utilization indicators account for factors that are under the control of the hospital. Therefore, the 
utilization measures can also be used for evaluating the health outcome in order to improve the quality of 
the health care system (Giuffrida, Hugh, & Martin, 1999). This means that services designed to improve 
that outcome related to those factors that are under the control of the hospital staff can be better predictors 
of quality than pure outcome-based measures (Giuffrida et al., 1999). Both outcome-based and utilization-
based measures underscore the problems that exist in capturing the multifaceted value of health care 
quality. On the other hand, the outcome of care could itself be the source of the problem if outcomes reflect 
both the power of the medical staff and the outcome of health care contributing to a certain result with a 
given set of resources (Giuffrida et al., 1999). In short, the utilization of these measures can affect the 
outcome of care and thus the outcome of the quality of care.   
 
 
 
 
2.1.1 Outcome-based health care and competition 
 
Many empirical studies have postulated that the effect on quality care from hospital competition stems 
from the type of health insurance coverage and for-profit status of the hospital. These studies have most 
commonly, measured hospital competition by using Herfindahl-Hirchman Index (HHI) for hospital market 
shares and using AMI mortality rates as measures of health care quality.  In relation to these measures, 
Propper, Burgess and Green (2004) were among the early papers to examine the effect of competition on 
quality using AMI mortality rates in the U.K. during 1991-1999. The study uses the AMI mortality rate as a 
measure of hospital quality whereas competition is measured by HHIs calculated for catchment areas in 
patient travel times (Propper et al., 2004). The study finds the existence of negative association between 
hospital competition and the quality of care, but the estimated effect is fairly small. Likewise, Mukamel, 
Zwangziger and Tomaszewski (2001) examined the risk-adjusted mortality rates for 30-days post 
admissions to evaluate the effect on hospital quality of care in the U.S. The analysis of the quality of 
clinical care examines the excess death rates for 4 specific medical conditions: AMI mortality, congestive 
heart failure, pneumonia, and stroke. The method to measure the excess mortality rate is to use the 
difference between the observed mortality rate in the hospital and the risk-adjusted mortality rate whereas 
the hospital competition is measured in numbers of county admissions by using the HHI‟s for hospital 
market shares (Mukamel et al., 2001). The study finds that the risk-adjusted mortality rates are significantly 
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higher for for-profit hospitals compared to the not-for-profit private hospitals and the excess mortality 
deviates by 11.5 times (Mukamel et al., 2001). Further, the study infers that market concentration for an 
HMO rather than hospital competition has the most significant effect on the reduction on mortality and that 
higher hospital expenditure contributes to lower mortality when patients‟ insurance is characterized by an 
HMO (Mukamel et al., 2001). This finding conductive to the view that patients with HMO coverage are 
generally likely to increase their consumption of health care leading to mortality reducing effect and 
improved health care status.  Considering the type of hospital ownership, McClellan and Staiger (2000) 
found out that on average the for-profit hospitals have higher hospital mortality rates for patients with heart 
disease, although the difference is marginal in relation to the not-for-profit hospitals. This means that 
hospitals with better outcome of health care quality and lower mortality rates will to a lesser extent be 
hospitals with for-profit market structure. However, as McClellan and Staiger (2000) also have outlined the 
advantage with the for-profit hospitals comes from the specialization in the most profitable health services 
leading to a higher propensity to monitor hospital services by using local expertise in the specific markets. 
 
Gowrisankaran and Town (2003) estimated the effects of competition by using the Medicare and HMO 
health insurance in Southern California and measuring hospital mortality with two diagnoses. That is, the 
risk-adjusted hospital mortality rates for pneumonia and AMI mortality patients. The method to measure 
hospital competition uses each insurance arrangement‟s patient flow in counties of Los Angeles. The study 
finds that an intensified competition for HMO patients is associated with a decreased risk-adjusted hospital 
mortality rate and competition for Medicare patients is associated with increased risk-adjusted hospital 
mortality rate. Therefore, an intensified competition for patients that are covered by an HMO benefits both 
price reductions and contributes to decreases in mortality rates (Gowrisankaran & Town, 2003).  Similarly, 
Lie and Phelps (2008) have examined the effect of non-price managed care competition and its possible 
effect on the quality of care in New York State Children‟s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP). The method 
for measuring SCHIP competition uses the number of eligible children enrolled in managed care plans.  
The method used to measure quality of health care uses the Consumer Assessment of Health Plans Survey 
and three Health Plan Employer data, as well as Information Set Scores (Liu & Pheleps, 2008). By doing so 
the authors found the existence of negative association between non-price managed care competition and 
the quality of health care. Further, Escarce, Jain and Rogowski (2006) assessed the effects of hospital 
competition and HMO insurance on mortality for six medical conditions in California, New York, and 
Wisconsin. The study measures hospital competition with 75 and 90 percent radii for the hospital and 
quality as admissions-based 30-days morality rate for six medical conditions. By using these methods the 
authors found that the hospital market in highly competitive areas will tend to improve the quality of care 
in the absence of mature managed care plans. This implies that an increase in the hospital competition 
contributes to higher health care quality, but with more HMO coverage the likelihood of improving health 
care quality will be lower (Escarce et al., 2006).  
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More recent evidence outlines that hospital competition‟s effect on quality of care is complicated by the 
prevailing difference in health insurance and possibility of price competition.  For instance, Volpp, 
Ketchman, Epstein and Williams (2005) assessed the effect of price competition and reduced health care 
subsidies on in-hospital mortality in the U.S. The in-hospital mortality is calculated by using hospital 
discharge rates for seven conditions whereas hospital competition is calculated by using patient-flow data 
in hospital market areas. This study finds that retaining large number of patients in hospitals will have 
positive effect on larger hospital capacity due to intensified price competition that, in turn, leads to 
worsened outcome for health care quality (Volpp et al., 2005). Their finding shows that the price 
competition leads to statistically significant increases in mortality for uninsured patients compared to 
insured patients with congestive heart failure. For instance, for insured patients, the statistically significant 
increases in mortality are found for patients with stroke (Volpp et al., 2005). Moreover, the study concludes 
that price competition may worsen the quality outcome by altering the rate of mortality in less competitive 
markets. This was the case in New Jersey that had smaller increases in mortality compared to the New 
York‟s average market competitiveness. This means that smaller market competitiveness seems to be an 
important element in determining mortality reduction for insured patients living in less competitive areas. 
 
Most recent empirical findings can be outlined as follows. Bloom, Propper, Seiler and Reenen (2010) argue 
that hospital competition correlates with better management quality and lower mortality rates for 
emergency AMI patients. The study controls for the number of rival hospital locations in marginal districts 
by constructing catchment areas and measures of political vulnerability to analyze the effect of English 
NHS reforms. The overall objective of the study is to find out whether NHS reforms aimed at improved 
patient choice were able to motivate hospitals to improve their performance. The methods used for quality 
are difference-in-difference estimators for 30-days AMI mortality and for hospital competition using HHIs 
in terms of the actual and predicted patient flows.  The study also uses measures of relative political 
marginality of constituencies and shows that there is a lower risk for closure in the absence of support from 
the governing party (Cooper, Gibbons, Jones & McGuire, 2011). The study finds that lower bargaining 
power of the governing party NHS reforms contributed to higher quality of care to a large extent owed to 
considerable decreases in mortality rates for patients living in more competitive areas. 
 
2.1.2 Utilization- based health care and competition  
 
 
Evidence states that, as hospitals pay particular attention to cost-containment in addressing patients‟ 
demands such that the reduction in the length of stay is often necessary condition to ensure release of 
hospitals capacity for treatments and provision of services (NHS, Institute for Innovation and 
Improvement). Therefore, hospital operation capacity has increasingly been a function of hospital‟s costs 
and the extent of patient‟s health care utilization (Benton, 1996). At the same time, there are differences in 
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the hospital ownership type that affect hospital‟s length of stay so that, for instance, hospitals with for-
profit status will to a larger extent have higher incentive to lower length of hospital stay than public 
hospitals because there are greater pressures on these hospitals to reduce their costs. Magnussen and  
Mobley (1999) as well as Yuan, Cooper, Einstadter, Cebul and Rimm (2000) examined the association 
between hospital arrangements that are expected to influence hospital‟s mortality and the average length of 
hospital stay (ALOS) in the hospitalized care of Medicare beneficiaries during the 10-year period for acute 
care hospitals in the U.S. The study finds that patients with not-for-profit hospital status face 10 to 20 
percent longer ALOS for the risk-adjusted AMI mortality patients, compared to patients in another hospital 
setting for most diagnoses (Yuan, Cooper, Einstadter, Cebul & Rimm, 2000). In other words, the hospital‟s 
for-profit status distinguished by higher demand for cost containment in relation to the not-for-profit 
hospitals leads to lower excess ALOS. However, Magnussen and Mobley (1999) also point out that for 
profit-status of the hospital does not generally guarantee the superior operational capacity of the hospital.  
The study examined the capacity utilization, productive efficiency, and the consequences of empty beds in 
four different market environments in highly regulated Norwegian hospitals and unregulated private 
hospitals in California. The study finds that Norwegian hospitals have lower degree of hospital competition 
in relation to California hospitals and the latter has higher level of utilization of plant capacity. Due to 
higher level of utilization of plant capacity hospital competition‟s variations in the California hospitals 
shows that Californian hospitals will have better reserve capacity in excess of maximum demand. However, 
the study also suggests that for-profit Californian hospitals do not have better operational capacity than 
their Norwegian counterparts. 
 
Furthermore, the empirical evidence postulates that shorter ALOS leads to better quality of care due to an 
improved efficiency when hospital cost pressures rise. For example, Battleman, Callahan and Thaler (2002) 
assess the interaction between the quality and health care resources by using ALOS measure for antibiotic 
delivery in the treatment of pneumonia. The study finds that rapid initiation of antibiotics and appropriate 
selection in the emergency department is crucial for shortening the ALOS because it determines the effect 
on health care quality as a result of the shorter ALOS for patients with community-acquired pneumonia 
(Battleman et al., 2002; Clarke, 2002). Previously, Clarke, Row and Black (1996) have also stated that in 
case of correct patient allocations, the lower ALOS leads to better qualitative outcomes for patients in the 
form of reduction in the risk of infection in the first 10 days.  That means that, with rising cost containment 
pressures makes it necessary for hospitals to reduce the ALOS and that improves the outcome for health 
care quality (Clarke, 2002). Clarke, Row and Black (1996) findings also supports use of ALOS measures 
which they argue justified from the point of view of efficiency in the use of hospital beds because 
otherwise the ineffective health care utilization represented by longer ALOS results in health deterioration 
for nosocomial infections (Kossovsky, Sarasin, Chopard, Louis-Simonet, Sigaud, Perneger & Gaspoz, 
2002). The increase in the risk of nosocomial infections implies that the reduced postoperative in-hospital 
stay should be a priority because more balanced hospital stay influences the improved blood sugar and 
blood pressure for AMI patients (Schofield, 2005). Similar arguments were also raised by Clarke (2002) 
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who pointed out that increases in the ALOS are undersirable since there would be an increase in morbidity 
from the risks of acquiring hospital infections in the form of abdominal hysterectomy after operative 
surgical procedure.  That is, acquiring abdominal hysterectomy infections would lead to patients being 
hospitalized 3.55 days longer than patients in the control group (Kandula & Wenzel, 1993). In sum, the 
evidence underscores that given rising cost pressures in hospitals; the ALOS is in fact a proper measure of 
quality of hospital services that is seen as an indicator of the risk associated with diseases and efficiency in 
the use of health services. 
 
2.2 Summary  
This chapter has presented empirical findings and measures used to investigate the effect of hospital 
competition on quality of care within the framework of outcome-based quality measures and utilization- 
based quality measures. In the case of the outcome-based measures the hospital mortality measures have 
been widely used due to their relation with the undesired health outcome from hospital treatment. Studies 
using outcome-based AMI mortality measures pointed out that for-profit hospital activities seemingly 
negatively associated with mortality rates while the nature of the relationship is not always negative due to 
differences in patient insurance and price competition. The methods used by these studies to calculate 
hospital quality and health care competition also generally vary.  In the case of utilization-based measures 
the ALOS has also been increasingly used as a measure accounting health care service utilization that 
affects the outcome of hospital treatment in the context of greater hospital competition. In general, the use 
of quantitative methods by the regional studies to measure quality and hospital competition is also 
comparable to this international research because the AMI mortality and ALOS measures have been widely 
used. Therefore, the framework of reviewing utilization-based measures and outcome-based contribute to 
knowledge of how the multifaceted value of health care quality is associated with development of improved 
hospital performance applicable for different types of hospitals. The empirical findings also contribute to 
the understanding for the promotion of health care policy developments in the framework of ALOS 
reduction. 
 
 
 
 
 
3  Conceptual framework 
 
 
This chapter will present a theoretical argument for using hospital density as a measure of hospital 
competition. To the knowledge of the researcher, there seems to be basically one theory that is used to 
explain the notion of quantity-quality restraints of hospital services. Therefore, this chapter begins by 
describing the theory in relation to the present study. It then draws a link between the theory and hospital 
competition and the number of hospitals taken as a proxy for hospital competition. Furthermore, the 
chapter will discuss some of the problems that arise as a potential weakness to comparison of hospital 
density across different countries. Next, it will discuss the concept of health care quality and how quality 
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can be understood as the outcome measure, in the context of hospital‟s operation capacity and monitoring 
practices. Furthermore, related to the other quality measure used to measure quality, the length of hospital 
stay, the theory discusses financial incentives and health care policies priorities that were prevalent in 
different hospitals. The chapter then concludes with two hypotheses that formulate the underscore 
association between hospital competition and health care quality.  
 
3.1 Competition in the hospital market 
 
 
Newhouse (1970) developed a model of utility maximization, which was applied to the hospital sector. In 
the Newhouse model, hospitals aim to maximize both the quantity and quality dimensions which subject to 
financial constraints (Morris, Devlin, Nancy, Parkin & David, 2003). Quantity and quality will be 
measured as a single dimension and together they comprise of the output of the hospital. As Morris et al. 
(2003) argue the quantity of services could be measured in several ways, such as: 
 
 
 
1. The number of patients treated  
 
2. The number of days of patient care provided 
 
 
The implication of the Newhouse theory assumes that hospital administrators are interested in increasing 
both the quality and quantity of hospital output regardless of the hospital ownership structure. In other 
words, if there are large concentrations of for-profit companies relative to not-for-profit companies or vice 
versa (Newhouse, 1970), the hospital market may show a tendency to be more competitive. According to 
Newhouse (1970), medical staff played a crucial role in the decision-making regarding resource allocation 
and who have a genuine interest in maintaining a balance between the various services provided. This still 
seems to be the case with Morris et al. (2009) pointing out that it is the decision-makers who choose an 
optimal combination of quality and quantity frontier that maximizes utility. Further, this occurs when the 
frontier is tangent to the highest attainable indifference curve (Morris et al., 2009). 
 
Considering the quantity and quality domains of hospital services, it is reasonable to question how 
increased hospital competition can improve quality of care. Recent studies show that there are several 
possible ways of analyzing hospital competition in relation to the number of hospitals. First, if the number 
of hospitals is taken as a proxy for hospital competition it is a likely to indicate that when the quantity of 
hospitals in hospital market increases, hospitals will also be more competitive because of the greater choice 
of health care services available to the patients. Second, the presence of hospitals in a certain area shows 
how intense hospital competition is with respect to delivering health care services (Ecevit, Eyyup, Ciftci, 
Fatih, Ag & Yusuf, 2010). Finally, the hospitals that have many competitors may be compelled to increase 
the quality of care in order to attract patients and increase revenues (Morris et al., 2003). This means that 
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these pressures arise when numbers of competitors‟ increases since hospitals that are operating in highly 
competitive areas possibly encounter more pressure to improve the quality of health care relative to those 
hospitals that have no or few competitors (Morris et al., 2009). In this way, hospital competition also aids 
in improving their management capacity and quality of health care by insuring better utilization of services 
and lower excess capacity (Devers, Brewster & Casalino, 2003).  
 
However, there are problems that arise when dealing with hospital competition. First, the comparability of 
hospital competition across countries is that countries with different healthcare systems may experience 
different effects from hospital competition on the quality of care. This means that countries distinguished 
by a greater level of financial reimbursement may incur different burdens of financial responsibility for the 
consumption of health services (Donaldson & Gerad, 1990). Second, countries that are confined by public 
financing arrangements for example might be more modest in pursuing competition in the health care since 
they rely on the government in the use of public funds to deliver health care services (OECD health data, 
2011). For example, in Norway, Finland, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland hospitals in the public sector will 
have higher incentives to increase the provision of health care relative to those countries where competition 
is more openly promoted (Ettelt, 2007). Therefore, countries with different healthcare systems may 
experience different effects from competition on health care quality. 
 
Second, the problem with comparing hospital density among different countries is that higher quantities of 
health care services might, however, lead to „inflated‟ expectations if there appears to be a greater 
incidence of hospital service available because of the tendency to expect more for additional service 
consumed. Countries that are characterized by cost sharing arrangements with public and private schemes, 
including greater use of out of pocket payments, are Japan, Korea, the U.S., and Canada will have more 
direct association between the provision of additional services for direct payments and the increasing use of 
hospital services.  Hospitals are prone to provide additional services if they are reimbursed according to the 
(ASHA, 1997-2013) reimbursement which is a pre-payment method for a certain episode of treatment. 
Prospective reimbursement gives more incentives to offer additional services for hospitals that are under 
harder budget constraints are prone to maximize their income, which is possible by admitting more patients 
(Donaldson & Gerad, 1990). Thus, the large hospital density might be indicative of the differences in 
countries cost sharing arrangements and systems of reimbursements. 
 
3.2 Quality of health care  
 
The outcome-based measure of health care in the previous research is overwhelming associated with 
hospital deaths.  The use of outcome-based mortality measures is, in turn, motivated by the desire to reduce 
hospital mortality for admitted patients (Sixma, Kerssens, Campén & Peters, 1998). Therefore, hospital 
mortality measures have also been overwhelmingly used in the previous empirical studies and are easily 
accessible in hospital statistics for patients‟ admissions. At the same time, as it has been pointed out by 
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Romano and Mutter (2004) mortality rates can also be used as a benchmark of quality for internal hospital 
failures that occur in the health care system. Therefore, the quality of health care services represented by 
mortality measure becomes a useful proxy only when hospital‟s health care delivery and treatments also 
manage to reduce sources of the potential risk associated with acute illness. This means accounting for 
factors that are positively associated with the use of hospital services and negatively associated with 
hospital‟s quality (WHO, 2008). 
 
To assess the underlying determinants of health care mortality requires closer examination towards quantity 
constraint in relation to hospital‟s operational capacity.  Recent studies pointed out that decision maker are 
influencing hospital‟s operational capacity with an appropriate balance between various services associated 
with the quantity of available facilities, the quantity of service provisions and equipment (Adair, Simpson, 
Casebeer, Birdsell, Hayden & Lewis, 2006; Romano & Mutter, 2004; Li & Benton, 2003). In other words, 
in determining management capacity the decision makers have a prevailing interest in maintaining 
operational capacity of the hospital. This means that hospitals find the optimal combination in regards to 
the quantity of, for instance, in-patient admissions, instant surgery, and service offerings that are likely to 
affect the future outcome of hospital quality. Then, the balance of the services provided should ensure that 
the input of emergency admissions, patients‟ length of stay and patient classification mix is equivalent to 
the increased in demand for hospital services (Li & Benton, 2003). Thus, it appears reasonable to use 
quantitative measures of health care services in the context of hospital competition as it provides an 
indication of the possible future effect on hospital quality. 
 
The evaluation criterion for hospital health care quality in hospitals is associated with the use of heath care 
monitoring strategies (WHO, 2007). Health care monitoring, in turn, requires making sure that hospitals 
comply with quality regulations because in hospital service provisions monitoring deter defects and 
therefore defines the level of quality of hospital services (Brewster & Watson, 2011).  At the same time, the 
evaluation of hospital quality may result in different practices being used in the relation to different hospital 
types. For example, in the case of private hospital arrangements the monitoring that is used among the not-
for-profit hospitals and for-profit hospitals will have similar effects due to pronounced goals to contain 
hospital costs and lower hospital excess capacity. The public hospitals are however, distinguished by their 
larger size and operational capacity (Brewster & Watson, 2011). As a result, differences in the assessment 
of performance may stem from differences in hospital type that are essentially distinguished by the initial 
conditions of hospital‟s quantity and quality constraints. 
 
Moreover, many health care systems are distinguished by financial incentives to insure that hospital‟s 
operational capacity becomes efficient in reducing the excess ALOS in hospitals. This means that financial 
incentives are built in health care systems to generate improvements in the quality of care by means of 
shortening the excess ALOS. There are a number of reasons for hospitals to pursue reduction in the excess 
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ALOS. First, reducing the excess ALOS insures increases in patients‟ admissions and incidence of hospital 
treatments (Clarke & Rose, 2001). That is to say, with shorter ALOS it becomes possible to increase patient 
admissions and simultaneously the quantity domain of hospital service delivery (Clarke & Rose, 2001). 
Second, the larger patient admissions are in turn only possible when there is an increase in demand for 
hospital services. Therefore, the management operations and financial incentives are internal to the 
hospitals in the assessment of quality to see whether it is possible to increase patient admissions (Rhee, 
1976; Alexander, Jeffrey, Weiner, Shortell & Baker, 2007). Thus, different hospitals distinguished by the 
for-profit and not-for-profit status, physicians‟ arrangements, and accreditation are driven by different 
financial incentives to increase patient admissions given improved operational capacity of the hospital 
(Aiken, Clarke & Sloane, 2002).  
 
The primary target of health care policy reforms in hospitals have been both the subject of hospital 
downsizing particularly with regard to large public hospitals and consolidation of smaller scale services in 
hospitals to reach acceptable levels of ALOS (Green & Nguyen, 2001). The policy priority with regard to 
downsizing or consolidating could be grounded in the initial size of the hospital. For instance, hospital 
management can be particularly concerned with the reduction in the excess of hospital capacity to ensure 
appropriate balance between costs and patient delays in order to reach the target occupancy rate (Green & 
Nguyen, 2001). Previously, health care reforms have promoted the reduction in hospital beds due to the 
prevailing excess capacity in public hospitals. The excess capacity in public hospitals is required to be 
balanced to increase the incidence of treatments (Green & Nguyen, 2001). Therefore, downsizing coupled 
with maintenance of large number admissions have been the preferred hospital choice to maintain the target 
occupancy. However, it may be difficult to determine the level of downsizing in the relation to the target 
occupancy rate. Green and Nguyen (2001) make a valid point that measuring occupancy levels could be 
misleading because there is no obvious relation to the excess capacity. That is, it is difficult to know 
exactly how the excess capacity and the actual occupancy requirement that is needed in hospitals in order to 
achieve quality goals in relation to hospital services.  
 
3.3 Hypotheses 
 
The study presents the two hypotheses in relation to the two hospital quality measures used. First, the 
argument is that greater hospital competition has the tendency to improve the quality when hospitals attract 
patients‟ demand thereby increasing the consumption of health care related services. That means that 
hospitals are expected to increase the provision of medical treatments and quantity of services such that an 
increase in hospital‟ service provisions would be equivalent to higher demand for hospital services. Thus, 
in light of the increase in quantity of service provisions and greater patient consumption of health care 
services hospital competition is likely to improve the quality of their hospital services.                                                                                                               
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The following hypothesis describes the association that depicts the expected effect of hospital competition 
on the outcome of hospital quality. 
 
Hypothesis 1 In the context of increased hospital competition hospitals increase the provision of services 
that aids in improving hospital quality when patient consumption of medical services increases. 
 
 
Second, the argument is that the greater utilization of hospital treatments comes from the greater use of 
hospital resources in the hospital facilities (Hensher, Edwards & Stokes, 1999). Therefore, an increase in 
the demand for hospital services is likely to increase pressures to reduce hospital‟s excess ALOS with goal 
to increase efficiency and improve operational capacity of the hospital.  Therefore, lower excess ALOS 
leads to freer operational capacity for patient admissions and treatments regardless of the hospital market 
type and ownership form (Cooper, Gibbons, Jones & McGuire, 2011). Further, as the excess ALOS in 
hospitals decreases it becomes possible to make treatments and hence health care utilization more intensive 
when patients also simultaneously consume more services at the margin.  Thus, with more intensive 
hospital treatment the operational capacity of the hospital improves when hospital competition rises.               
 
The following hypothesis describes the expected association between hospital competition and health care 
quality with respect to utilization of health care services. 
 
Hypothesis 2 Greater hospitals competition leads to lower excess capacity when hospitals are better able to 
utilize health service delivery by offering better patient treatments. 
 
 
 
3.4 Summary  
 
The theoretical framework has approached density measure of hospital competition and quality of care as 
the outcome-based measure and as a measure of hospital utilization by arguing that hospital decision-
makers aim to maximize hospital‟s utility by determining an optimal combination of quality and quantity 
constraints. Further, the chapter has discussed the problems in comparability in hospital density across 
countries, such as differences in the financial reimbursements and hospital operational capacity. Then, the 
quality of health care is discussed in relation to the quantity of health services provided and by using health 
care monitoring strategies that guides the process of health care quality improvements.  Next, in relation to 
the use of health care services the conceptual framework points out that hospital characteristics and hence 
practices are subject to different priorities depended on the financial incentives in different hospitals such 
as health care systems, for-profit status and management of operational capacity. Finally, the chapter 
argued by using the two hypotheses that hospital competition aids in providing improved hospital quality 
when there is a growing competitive pressure to increase the provision of services. 
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4 Data 
 
The annual data for the variables used to assess the quality of care and hospital competition have been 
collected from the OECD health statistics, except for the control variable the out-of-pocket expenditure, 
which have been retrieved from the World Bank, 2012. Further, the data extracted is available 
approximately between 2000 and 2009. The two quality measures are used in the assessment of hospital 
quality of care. That is, the in-hospital admissions-based 30 days mortality rate for AMI patient measured 
in percentages and the length of hospital stay by acute AMI patients measured in days. The hospital 
competition measure is the number of hospitals per million of the population available at the country level. 
Then, the control variables added to the regression model associated with the outcome of hospital care, 
hospital‟s operational capacity, demographic characteristics and health care expenditure.  
 
 
 
 
4.1  The empirical strategy 
 
 
This chapter will present an empirical strategy used for the two regression models to estimate the effect of 
hospital competition on the quality of health care. Further, the sub-chapter argues that all countries are 
heterogeneous in their hospital market development. Due to this, there may be unobserved factors that will 
influence the performance of hospitals, which are not possible to control specifically. Therefore, country 
dummy variables are used in the regression models to control for unobservable factors.  Next, the chapter 
develops another regression model to control the differences in health care systems. According to Bjegović 
and  Donev (2004) there are two basic models that can be used in analyzing channels of health care 
delivery that are characteristic in general to the OECD countries: the public model and mixed models. 
These two main models are suitable for the analysis of this research because separating the regression 
models allow control specifically for the differences in the health care system. Moreover, by having two 
regression models, it becomes possible to answer two questions of the thesis by focusing on two different 
approaches to hospital competition, that is, observed and unobserved factors in countries. The chapter then 
presents different specification models that are adequate in relation to the comparison of the results 
between the two different regression models used that account for observable and unobservable 
characteristics. 
 
 
4.2   Method 
 
The empirical analysis examines the ordinary least square (OLS) regression model of the two measures of 
health care quality and hospital competition.  The first measure of quality is the percentage of admissions-
based in-hospital, 30-days acute AMI mortality rate available for 19 OECD countries.  The second measure 
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is the length of in-hospital stay for acute AMI mortality for 18 OECD countries. There are 18 countries in 
the second regression models due to Sweden‟s country profile missing for the variable average length of in-
hospital stay. All the results are delivered by using EViews 6, correcting for heteroscedastisity and 
potential autocorrelation with robust standard errors. In relation to heterogeneity in the hospital market 
development countries are expected to have unobserved characteristics at the country level that are 
controlled by using country dummies in first regressions of both models. Next, to specifically analyze 
whether the results are comparable across different specification regressions the second model considers 
distinguishing countries‟ health care system according to the two main models. That is, the public model 
and health insurance model. The public model characterized by government ownership and the prominence 
of public providers as in countries such as New Zealand, the UK, and Sweden. The characteristic of the 
public model is the state-budgeted financing of health care unrelated to income (Bjegović & Donev, 2004) 
and the NHS that is funded from general taxes and the free access to all citizens (Mills, 2011). Thus, due to 
the predominance of public hospital providers that limits hospital competition in the public model an 
increase in hospital competition is likely to be associated with an increase in the quantity domain of 
hospital‟s service provision. The health insurance model which is also known as mixed model is 
characterized by a public contract system as in Germany and Netherlands and reimbursement system as in 
Belgium. The underlying characteristic of the model is compulsory social insurance that is funded by the 
employers and employees with a combination of public and private hospital providers. That is to say, the 
health insurance model emphasizes the contractual relationship between the provider and the purchaser of 
health services. In this model, the purchasers of health care are active negotiators for the price of health 
care which indicates greater competitive pressures in the promotion of hospital competition compared to 
the public model (Anell, 1996). 
In the case of the United States the health care system is characterized by private health care insurance. In 
this health care system the financing mechanisms of health care system are largely driven by the market 
forces in which there are employers that are the direct purchases of health insurance. There are also the 
Medicare and Medicaid insurance channels of health care provision that possess the elements of both the 
public and mixed models (Bjegović and Donev, 2004). Thus, considering the view of Bjegović and Donev 
(2004) that point out different elements of health care provision motivates the inclusion of the U.S. in the 
public and mixed models of health care system.  
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The idea of analyzing the two questions as of how hospital competition is expected to influence the quality 
of care is illustrated in the figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 The observed and unobserved factors influencing hospital competition‟s effect on health care 
quality. 
                   Hospital Competition (public & private providers) 
 
                                                                           Q2. 
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                                    Quality of Health Care 
 
 
To address the two underlying questions of the thesis Figure 1 portrays the two methods used to analyze 
hospital competition‟s effect on the quality of care. The first approach of the model 1 shows that hospital 
performance is expected to influence quality in the context of the channel influenced by unobserved 
country heterogeneity. This is due to differences in stages of development towards hospital competition in 
different countries that may be causing countries to experience different effects from hospital competition 
on the quality of care. Therefore, country dummy are associated with factors that are not possible to control 
specifically and that might be resistant towards the implementation of health care policy reforms. They, 
therefore, may pick up factors that capture, for instance, cultural and institutional heterogeneity of the 
countries included.  Second, in the model 2 the analysis aims to control for the observed country-
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heterogeneity that distinguish health care systems in the framework of public and mixed models.  This 
means that countries that basically belong to these models are expected to experience hospital 
competition‟s impact on health care quality outcome according these models‟ system-related financial 
reimbursement. The model 2 then assumes the prevalence of private channels of health care provision in 
the mixed model will have the tendency to deliver higher degree of hospital competition.  
 
The effect of hospital competition on mortality and length of hospital stay for AMI patients is also 
influenced by the factors that are associated with the outcome of health care and utilization of health care in 
both models. As a result, these factors are classified according to the characteristics associated with 
outcome of hospital care, operational capacity of the hospital, demographic characteristics and the type of 
health care expenditure. Later, the control variables are specified in all regression models and analyzed 
with respect to their reinforcing effect on the variable hospital competition and then closely examined on 
the two quality indicators. 
 
 
1. The admissions-based in-hospital 30-days mortality rate for acute AMI and hospital competition. 
 
The first regression model is specified by using admissions-based 30-days in-hospital mortality rate for 
acute AMI patients as the dependent variable: 
 
Regression model  1: 
 
                                                                                   
                                                                                
In the regression model 1       is the dependent variable that denotes i for a country at time t for all 
available years denoted as the percentage of admissions-based 30-days mortality rate for acute AMI.  The 
AMI mortality rate measures in-hospital deaths within 30 days of emergency admissions because acute 
mortality measure aid in omitting possible patient self-selection when the health condition is acute (Propper 
et al., 2002). Then, the hospital competition measure is denoted by               for country i at time t and 
represent the number of hospitals per million of the population available as a hospital density at the country 
level.            denote the size of the coefficient for each variable. Further, additional control variables 
are considered. First, the        and stenting that denotes percutaneous transluminal coronary angioplasty 
for 10000 population at time t for country i. The PTCA and stenting measures the number of invasive 
procedures performed that controls for the quality for hospital care for AMI patients. The primary 
physicians and specialized physicians are similarly used as measures influencing the outcome of hospital 
treatment. Namely,        denotes general medical practitioner for 1000 population and         denotes a 
specialized medical practitioner for 1000 population. Second, in relation to hospital‟s operation capacity  
                 denotes the number of beds per million of population and measures hospital‟s relative 
size. The          denotes discharge rates for the diseases per circularly per 100 000 population and 
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measures the number of patients that leave the hospitals after the finalization of treatment. Third, to account 
for demographic characteristics in the use of health services         denotes the number of people at the 
age of 65 years or older and measures the share of the old age individuals that use the health care services. 
Further, the regression includes           that measures the use of health services by the females in the 
population for country i at time t.  In most countries the percentage of females will slightly be higher than 
for males which indicates greater use of health services by females. Forth, to control for the channel of 
health care expenditure               measures total health care expenditure as a percentage of GDP. The 
      denotes the out-of-pocket expenditure as percentage of private health expenditure and measures the 
percentage of private health expenditure on health. To control for unobserved heterogeneity among 
countries the first regression model specifies the dummy variable    for country i which used to account for 
the unobserved country characteristics of the model 1. In the second model the regression model drops the 
dummy variable and specifies countries into two separate regressions for the mixed and public models that 
include the identical variables. 
Regression model 2: 
                                                                              
                                                                                   
 
 
2. Average length of stay as dependent variable 
 
 
The second empirical model specifies the dependent variables as the average length of hospital stay 
(ALOS) in days, by acute AMI patients as the measure of quality and includes the identical independent 
and control variables. The regression is, therefore, estimated to: 
 
Regression model 1: 
 
                                                                                   
                                                                                 
Regression models 2: 
                                                                              
                                                                                  
 
 
4.3 Summary  
This chapter has argued for the use of two regression models in answering the two questions in the context 
of models for observed and unobserved country heterogeneity. The first model included the country 
dummies in controlling for heterogeneity that are associated with unobserved factors at the country level 
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whereas the approach of the second model is to distinguish countries according to the public and mixed 
models of health care systems. The second model then distinguished public and mixed models by the 
channels of reimbursement influenced by the private and public hospital providers.  Then, the two 
approaches were illustrated in the figure where the second approach argued that mixed model is likely to 
generate greater positive impact from hospital competition on the quality of care in regards to the 
predominance of private channels of hospital providers in relation to the public model. Next, the chapter 
described the two identical specifications by using the two closely related but essentially different quality 
indicators. That is, the admission-based hospital mortality rate for acute AMI patients accounting for the 
outcome of care and the ALOS for acute AMI patients accounting for the use of health care services. These 
quality indicators used as dependent variables in the assessment of the impact of hospital competition on 
quality of care by first and second regression models respectively. The chapter then introduced 10 other 
control variables in the regression model in the assessment of the relation between quality of care and 
hospital competition. 
 
 
 
 
 
5   Variables 
 
 
The chapter begins with the description of variables used to measure hospital quality and hospital 
competition. First, the chapter describes the two measures used in the estimation of health care quality in 
relation to outcome of health care and utilization of health care services. In the following sections the 
reader is expected to find the available information about the average values used for each indicator 
available between 2002 and 2009 for each country. The average values of the control variables can be 
found in the Appendix.  The chapter then describes the variable for the number of hospitals which is taken 
as a proxy for hospital competition and analyzes how the measure is expected to influence the desired 
outcome for hospital quality. Finally, the chapter presents control variables and argues for these controls 
relation to the quality of care, hospital capacity, demographics, and health care expenditures and reviews 
the OECD countries‟ statistical trends.  
 
5.1  Quality measures - Dependent Variables 
 
In this section the two quality measures will be reviewed. Both measures are used as dependent variables to 
answer the two questions of the research in first and second models respectively. 
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5.1.1 Admissions-based in-hospital AMI mortality rate.  
 
The cardiovascular diseases account for main cause of mortality in most OECD countries and by 2009 the 
estimate has reached 35 percent of overall deaths (OECD health report, 2011). Therefore, hospital‟s disease 
related mortality rates have been used as measures of hospital quality due to mortality‟s direct association 
with undesired outcome from hospital treatments (Propper, Burgess & Green, 2004; Mukamel, Zwanziger 
& Tomaszewski, 2001; Keeler, Melnick & Zwanziger, 1999).  Previous empirical studies were 
predominantly focused on using these measures especially for acute diagnosis as proxies of hospital 
quality. Therefore, this study motivates the use of AMI measures as responsive towards the outcome for 
emergence treatment that reflects hospital‟s internal failures (Milcent, 2005; Propper et al., 2004; Keeler, 
Melnick & Zwanziger, 1999). In the context of OECD there is a considerable variation in the rate of AMI 
mortality among countries. For example, the largest mortality rate is observed in Austria, Germany, 
Belgium, Ireland, Finland, Spain, Netherlands, and USA which is between 7 and 20 percent per year during 
the 2003 and 2009 (see table 1). The U.S. has approximately 19 percent mortality rate from hospital 
treatments which is the largest overall mortality rate in the OECD, followed by Germany and Spain as the 
next large countries with relatively high mortality rates for patients suffering from increases in AMI 
mortality. Australia as well as relatively smaller countries such as Czech Republic, Italy, New Zealand, and 
Sweden all experience the variations in AMI mortality rates at approximately 5 and 8 percent. 
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Table 1   Average admissions-based in-hospital, 30-days AMI- mortality rate, percentage. 
 
Australia 6.314
a
 
Austria 10.185
a
 
Belgium 13.9
c
 
Canada 7.825
b
 
Czech Republic 7.825
b
 
Finland 11.014
a
 
Germany 10.6167
a
 
Ireland 8,8857
a
 
Israel 7.2714
a
 
Italy 6.7
c
 
Luxemburg 6.3167
b
 
Netherlands 8.1667
a
 
New Zeeland 5.8
b
 
Norway 7.1285
a
 
Poland 6.414285
a
 
Portugal 10.785
a
 
Spain 9.5857
a
 
Sweden 7.657
a
 
Switzerland 7.1571
a
 
USA 19.3157
a
 
Source: OECD health data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a   2003-2009 
 
c    2006-2009 
 
b   2004-2009 
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5.1.2 Average length of in-hospital stay in days by acute AMI.  
 
The average length of hospital stay (ALOS) in days by acute AMI is the measure of utilization of hospital 
services that contributes to the outcome of hospital treatments (McDermott & Stock, 2007). The ALOS 
measures also reflect both the duration of patient‟s illness and the possibility to discharge patients from the 
hospital when hospital‟s operation capacity improves in efficiency (Barros & Olivella, 2011). This means 
that the ALOS can be used not only in the assessment of hospital performance but also to determine 
whether the use of hospital services represented by ALOS measure contributes to lower hospital excess 
capacity (Devers, Brewster & Casalino, 2003). There was a particular interest in the ALOS measures in the 
previous research in the assessment of hospital‟s cost, hospital efficiency, quality of care, speed of service 
delivery as these measures related to hospital‟s performance (Clarke, 2002; Clarke, Row & Black, 1996; 
McDermott & Stock, 2007; Bundred, Maguire, Reynolds, Grimshaw, Morris, Thompson, Barr & Baildam, 
1998; Kossovsky, Sarasin, Chopard, Louis-Simonet, Sigaud, Perneger & Gazpoz, 2002). These studies 
motivate the applicability of ALOS measures in the hospital cost containment requirement in relation to 
hospital services. The trend in OECD countries has shown steadily decreased bed occupancy levels as a 
result of increased number of patients treated as a consequence of overall reduction in the ALOS by 
hospitals. The table 2 shows that there is a relatively high levels of ALOS in Finland, Germany, and Ireland 
and relatively lower ALOS values in Austria, Canada, Spain, Portugal, Poland, Italy, and Switzerland. The 
lowest value for ALOS is found in the U.S., Norway, and Australia with average of 5 to 6 days for acute 
AMI patients (Table 2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
30 
 
 
 
Table 2 Average length of stay in days, by acute AMI. 
 
Country  
Australia  6.24
a
 
Austria  9.03
a
 
Belgium  7.7
f
 
Canada  7.088
b
 
Czech Republic  7.3
e
 
Finland  11.92
a
 
Germany  10.95
e
 
Ireland  9.99
a
 
Israel  6.58
a
 
Italy  7.85
f
 
Netherlands  8.522
c
  
New Zeeland 8.4333
e
 
Norway 5.1375
d
 
Poland 7.575
d
 
Portugal 8.91
a
 
Spain 9.21
a
 
Switzerland 8.86
a
 
USA 5.47
a
 
Source: OECD health data  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
a
2000-2009   
f
 2006-2009   
b 
2000-2008   
e 
2004-2009 
c
 2001-2009                                                                                                                                                                                                
d 
2002-2009 
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5.2   Hospital competition measure 
 
 
 
The density measures for hospital competition are insensitive to the structure of the hospital market and are 
therefore expected to reflect patient‟s possibility to choose hospitals for a service (Gresenz, Rogowski & 
Escarce, 2004). Therefore, a count of available hospitals per million of the population represent an 
appropriate measure for hospital competition as high hospital density reflects the competitive pressure on 
hospitals to influence the patient‟s demand for higher quality treatments (Ecevit, Ciftci & Ag, 2010). 
Further, the data for hospital competition provides information at a geo-political level of aggregation of the 
country in which individuals reside (Andersen, 1983). That means that to the extent that the number of 
hospitals is high the distribution of medical resources in a country will also be high. The variable does not 
capture the relative sizes of hospitals which might be important to know if one wants to know hospitals‟ 
potential entrance to the hospital market (Ecevit et al., 2010).  However, the assumption is that the more 
hospitals there are in the country the better is the condition to improve hospital performance that would be 
a prerequisite for higher hospital quality. This means that when number of hospitals in the country is large 
the level of competition among hospitals will also be higher. The average OECD hospital density statistics 
is shown in table 3.  Several countries have a comparatively large number of hospitals per million of the 
population which are Australia and Finland with 54–59 hospitals, and there is a relatively smaller share of 
hospitals in Germany, Ireland, New Zealand, and Switzerland with 35–46 hospitals per million of the 
population (Table 3). Most countries have approximately 20 hospitals per million of the population, except 
for Netherlands with only 12 hospitals. The hospital density in the U.S. is 19.7 hospitals which might be 
explained by the tendency of monopolistic hospital structure captured by the difference of hospital to 
population density. That is, countries‟ smaller share of hospitals can be explained by larger hospital size in 
densely populated areas. 
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Table 3 Average number of hospitals for millions of the population. 
  
Australia 64.115
a
 
Austria 32.431
a
 
Belgium 19.613
f
 
Canada 22.0867
b
 
Czech Rep. 25.042
e
 
Finland 59.321
a
 
Germany 40.92
e
 
Ireland 43.71
a
 
Israel 17.06
a
 
Italy 21.3875
c
 
Netherlands 12.15
c
 
New Zeeland 35.16
e
 
Norway 15.356
d
 
Poland 22.835
d
 
Portugal 19.467
a
 
Spain 17.62
a
 
Switzerland 46.234
a
 
USA 19.729
a
 
Source: OECD health data  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a 2000-2009  
f  2006-2009 
 
b 2000-2008   
e 2004-2009  
c  2001-2009 
 
d 2002-2009
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5.3   Control variables 
 
 
 
The evidence on hospital quality classifies quality indicators as the outcome-based and the utilization-based 
measures. Therefore, the outcome on quality can be affected by the utilization of health care that is 
associated with hospital related factors.  First, as the medical personnel perform surgical procedures health 
care outcome is influenced by the ability to respond and address patient‟s requests and that determines an 
outcome on health care quality (Li & Benton, 2003). It means that surgical procedures measures showing 
higher incidence of medical operation give rise to the expectation that patients‟ health status should 
improve. Therefore, the utilization-based indicators are overwhelmingly are characterized by the actual 
quantity of hospital service provisions whereas the use of health care services is fixed by the proxy for 
operational capacity, most commonly, measured in the number of available beds (Li & Benton, 2003).  
Second, the utilization of hospital services may reflect hospital capacity as well because by having, for 
instance, larger discharge rate reflects hospital‟s capacity to perform higher incidence of hospital 
treatments. It is therefore possible to view the discharge rate as the capacity of the hospital to reduce excess 
ALOS when hospital treatments improve in efficiency.  Third, it is also possible to consider demographic 
characteristics such as gender and age as the greater use of health care services is believed to be due to the 
larger share of health service consumption in the population (Andersen, 1983). Therefore, by the inclusion 
of the elderly and females allows analyzing the extent of health care consumption by these groups.  Finally, 
to determine the type of health care expenditure the regression considers the total health care expenditure as 
percentage of GDP and Out-of-Pocket (OOP) expenditure as a percentage of private health expenditure. 
Higher share of public and private health care expenditure is an indication of the amount of resources spent 
on the consumption of health care services. This means that, with larger health expenditures one would 
expect to reflect higher level of hospital quality.  
 
5.3.1 In-patient Percutaneous Transluminal Coronary Angioplasty and stenting for 100 000 population 
 
The surgical procedures known as in-patient Percutaneous Transluminal Coronary Angioplasty (PTCA) 
and stenting per 100 000 of the population is a revascularization procedure used for treating the heart 
disease of AMI mortality as the leading cause of death in the OECD countries (Table 4, Appendix). The 
PTCA and stenting procedures are therefore related to the outcome of health treatments as these procedures 
effect the health outcome for patients with AMI diagnosis. Therefore, the PTCA and stenting is used as 
control for the outcome of hospital quality related to the hospital‟s capacity to perform surgical treatments 
if large numbers of PTCA procedures are performed. The highest incidence of procedures is observed in 
Germany and Belgium with 460-542.6 procedures on average between 2004 and 2009.  The relatively large 
countries such as the U.S. have lower rates of PTCA interventions, that is, 212 procedures on average per 
year. In Australia and Canada the rate is 144 and 133 procedures respectively. However, there are 
unexpectedly high numbers of PTCA procedures for smaller countries such as Norway, Israel, and Sweden 
with 239, 231 and 162 procedures per year (Table 4, Appendix). 
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5.3.2 General medical practitioners per 1000 of the population 
 
General medical practitioners per 1000 of the population measure the quality of hospital services in the 
provision of hospital‟s primary care due to general medical practitioner role as a reference for patients‟ 
visits to hospital facilities (Barros & Olivella, 2011; Dranove & White, 1994). In some NHS‟s the use of 
the general medical practitioner is motivated by screening before the referral to hospital treatment is 
possible. Therefore, general physicians are determining patient admissions and responsible for the co-
ordination to clinical specialists (Dranove & White, 1994). Referral by the general practitioner varies 
across different systems and is mandatory in Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, and the United Kingdom. 
However, the role the general practitioner has lower significance in France, Germany, and Belgium because 
the NHS is organized around the well-defined catchment areas and the capitation fees. This means that 
doctors are treating patients first at primary care facilities and detect health problems in time before making 
a hospital visit (Dranove & White, 1994). The highest share of general medical practitioners is observed in 
Germany, Portugal and Norway whereas the lowest incidence is found in Switzerland and the U.S. (see 
table 5, Appendix). 
 
 
 
5.3.3 Specialized medical practitioners per 1000 of the population 
 
The number of specialized medical practitioners per 1000 of the population is related to the outcome of 
hospital quality because the performance of surgical operation is only conducted by specialized medical 
professionals. The use of specialized medical practitioner is, therefore, increases the likelihood of improved 
hospital quality (OECD health data, 2011). Thus, the number of specialist medical practitioners influences 
the provision of health care services on the patient‟s health status as a result of the increased use of surgical 
interventions (Barros & Olivella, 2011). In highly competitive hospital markets one might expect that an 
increase in the use of specialized medical practitioner by the hospital is likely to lead to the improved 
quality of hospital treatments. Therefore, within the context of the growing demand for hospital services 
there is an incentive for hospitals to attract specialized practitioners aimed to influence the desired outcome 
from hospital treatments (Iversen, 2003; Noether, 1987). On average, the statistics for OECD countries 
show that there are 1 to 2 specialized practitioners per 1000 of the population for most OECD countries. 
There are more than 2 specialized practitioners in Czech Republic, Israel, Italy, Spain, and Switzerland and 
1 or at most 2 specialized practitioners in the U.S., Australia, Canada, and Germany (Table 6, Appendix). 
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5.3.4 Hospital beds per 100 000 inhabitants 
 
 
Hospital beds per 100 000 inhabitants‟ defines hospital‟s operational capacity related to the number of 
patients for possible hospital treatments (Table 7, Appendix). Therefore, the number of hospital beds is an 
indicator of relative hospital‟s size as numbers of available beds determine the availability of hospital 
admissions (Tay, 2003). The measure can therefore be considered as a benchmark with respect to hospital‟s 
operational capacity to carry out large number of possible surgery. The OECD health report (2011) 
suggests that there has been a slight reduction in the number of beds per capita during the period 2000–
2009 due to the progression in medical technology that allowed reductions in the needed patient 
hospitalization. Moreover, reduced need for hospitalization together with the reduction in the ALOS has 
been possible owed to increased incidence of surgeries that have increased the rate of discharged patients. 
The largest number of hospital beds is observed in Germany, Austria, Czech Republic, Finland and 
Belgium whereas the lowest numbers are found in New Zealand, Sweden and the U.S. (Table 7, 
Appendix).  
 
 
5.3.5 Hospital discharge rates by disease of the circularly per 100 000 population  
 
 
The discharge rate by disease of the circularly, per 100 000 population is an indicator of hospital‟s 
operational capacity as the increased patient admissions are possible when the rate of discharged patients 
received an AMI-related treatment increases (Table 8, Appendix). Furthermore, hospitals that are able to 
discharge patients at a faster rate might show a tendency to have higher relative efficiency due to an 
improved outcome for treated patients. Therefore, the larger discharge rate is likely to come as a result of 
improved quality for hospital treatments applicable in prevention of future AMI-related illness and 
identification of possible treatment (Health at a Glance, 2011). The largest discharge rates are found in 
Austria, Germany, Finland, Czech Republic, Norway, and Luxemburg whereas the lowest is in Canada and 
Spain (Table 8, Appendix). 
 
 
5.3.6 Percentage of elderly at the age of 65 or older 
 
 
The percentage of the population that has reached the age of 65 or older measures the percentage of old age 
individuals in the population and reflects demographic characteristics of the elderly in use of health care 
services. For most countries the percentage of the elderly at the age of 65 varies between 12 to 17 percent 
(Table 9, Appendix) which is indicative of the tendency of disproportionate use of health care services 
(Evashwick, Rowe, Rowe, Paula & Laurence, 1984). The underlying reason for this is that there have been 
demographic transitions together with advances in medical technology that significantly improved the 
access to health care facilities for the elderly. Moreover, the average visits per year are one and a half times 
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higher in the group for people at the age of 65 years or older than the people at the age 45–64 years due to 
demographic transitions. This led to elderly‟s generally higher ALOS and rising cost pressures for hospitals 
(Health at a Glance, 2011; Evashwick et al., 1984; Coulton & Frost, 1982). Recent evidence shows that the 
budgetary pressure rise in areas with high proportion of elderly which led to reductions in the health care 
consumption by the elderly in Sweden (Gerdtham, Lundin & Saez-Marti, 2005). In the U.S. the decline in 
the admissions for the elderly is tend to be explained by the differences in the health care status across 
different socioeconomic areas (Lagoe, 1986). The decline in admissions is, in turn, explained by fact that 
the elderly in different socioeconomic areas have encountered differences in the health care status due to 
differences in the consumption of health care (Evashwick et al., 1984). The highest number of elderly that 
use health care services more at the margin is observed in Japan, Belgium, Sweden and Spain whereas the 
lowest numbers of elderly are observed in Israel and Ireland (Table 9, Appendix). 
 
 
 
5.3.7   Percentage of females 
 
The female variable measures the percentage of females as a share of the population that represents the use 
of health care by the females. On average, the share of females in the population is larger than males for 
most countries according to (OECD trend in Table 10) which mean that females use health care services 
more extensively than males.  This indicates that females require greater consumption of the health care 
service confirmed by the evidence (Bertakis, Helms, Callahan & Robbins, 2000). There are also gender 
differences in the utilization of health care services with higher percentage of females using health care 
services due to greater episodes of acute illness. This leads to the assumption that an increase in the 
proportion of elderly females that may encounter AMI illness contributes to greater female use of health 
care service (Owens, 2008). The demographic characteristics in the population confirm that there are on 
average more females than males that use health care services for most countries included where the female 
population constitutes 50.5 and 51 percent (Table 10, Appendix). Thus, gender-related population 
characteristics also tend to explain higher overall female health care utilization. 
 
 
5.3.8 Total health expenditure as percentage of GDP 
 
The total health expenditure as a percentage of GDP measures the level of health care expenditure in the 
country (Table 11, Appendix).  This means that countries that spend more on the consumption in the 
relation to countries that spend less will encounter possibility for improved quality of hospital services. 
Thus, higher share of richer country‟s resources is allocated towards funding the use of health care services 
and the health service delivery will therefore have direct association with better hospital quality.  Moreover, 
the demand for health care is also determined by income elasticity showing that consumption of medical 
care occurs at the margin of medical expenses where countries that spend more are characterized by better 
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fixed capital and hence a possibility for patients to consume more hospital services (Parkin, 1987). The data 
for total health care expenditure available over the period 2000–2009 that shows the largest total health 
expenditure in the U.S compared to the rest of the OECD countries with 15.68 percent of its GDP allocated 
in the consumption of health care. Further, the largest health expenditure is found in Austria, Germany and 
Canada whereas the lowest health care expenditure is observed in Czech Republic, Ireland and Israel 
(Table 11, Appendix). 
 
It should be noted, however, that it is difficult know exactly the relation between quality of care health care 
expenditure as a percentage of GDP because at the margin, health care expenditure reflects rather the 
possible consumption of health care and not the actual patient health outcome (Parkin, 1987). For example 
in  the U.S., the average physician-and-nurse-to population ratio has been considerably lower than in most 
OECD despite very high levels of GDP per capita allocated for health care services. At the same time, the 
health care expenditure has also increased more than twofold in the U.S. in relation to the average level in 
most OECD countries with 4.0 percent versus 1.6 percent respectively, while the physician-to-population 
ratio grew at one percent (OECD Health at a Glance, 2011; Reinhardt, Hussey & Anderson, 2004).  
 
 
5.3.9 Out-of-pocket expenditure as a percentage of private health expenditure 
 
 
The out-of-pocket (OOP) expenditure is a measure of private health expenditure allocated to the 
consumption of health care services (World Bank, 2013; Table 12, Appendix). This means that, higher 
share of OOP expenditure reflects the differences between public and private health insurance schemes of 
the public and mixed models of health care systems. Higher percentage of OOP expenditure expectedly 
leads to larger burdens for private health expenditure in paying bills for the additional service consumed 
and might, in turn; result in overall reduced consumption of health care services (OECD Health at a Glance, 
2011). For OECD countries, the OOP expenditure constitutes approximately 19 percent of health care 
spending (OECD health at a Glance, 2011) with 35 percent for the U.S. and 89 percent for Czech Republic 
(Table 12, Appendix). This means that the OECD variation in the OOP expenditure is generally very high.  
Moreover, the other OECD countries with high shares of OOP expenditure are Poland, Spain, Switzerland, 
and Belgium and a very high in Norway whereas the relatively low share are found in Netherlands, U.S and 
Canada (Table 12, Appendix). 
 
5.4 Summary 
 
This chapter has first presented the two variables used in relation to health care quality such as admissions- 
based in-hospital mortality rate for acute AMI patients and the ALOS for acute AMI patients. These 
measures have also been reviewed in relation to OECD statistical trends available for the period 2000 and 
2009. Then, the variable hospitals per million of the population was introduced as proxy for hospital 
competition argued suitable to account for heterogeneity in hospital markets that distinguish countries 
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within the OECD. Next, the chapter has presented arguments for the use of control variables by drawing the 
link between the underlying characteristics of health care quality and the use of health care services. The 
control variables are suitable because they primarily related to the outcome of hospital care, hospital 
capacity, demographic characteristics and health care expenditure. Measures such as PTCA, specialized 
practitioners and general practitioners were introduced in controlling for factors associated with the 
outcome of hospital quality.  Further, in relation to hospital capacity hospital beds and discharge rates were 
introduced as these measures reflect the possibility of health care utilization.  Then, the percentage of 
females and number of the population at the age 65 or older were introduced as controls for the 
consumption of health care associated with gender and age that have increased the use of hospital services. 
Finally, the OOP expenditure and the total expenditure as share of GDP are considered in controlling for 
the financial channels of health care expenditure that have an effect on the increased consumption of health 
care services. The chapter then presented the average values used in the regression models and reviewed 
OECD statistical trends for different countries.
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6 Results  
 
The chapter 6 presents the results of the two regression models used for admissions-based 30 days in-
hospital mortality rate for AMI patients and the average length of hospital stay for acute AMI patients as 
measures of health care quality. The number of hospitals per million of the population is used as the 
measure of hospital competition. The control variables are added to the regression model according to their 
association with the outcome of health care quality, hospital operational capacity, demographic 
characteristics and type of health care expenditure. The control variables are primarily analyzed by 
reviewing their effect on the coefficient of hospital competition and the effect on the two measures of 
hospital quality. The chapter then discusses the results by drawing the analogy to whether they support the 
two hypotheses formulated in the theoretical framework.   
 
 
6.1 Admissions-based mortality rate of acute AMI in percentage and hospital competition  
 
The results from regression using mortality in-hospital 30 days admissions-based rate for AMI patients are 
shown in the table 13. In all regressions p-values are presented accordingly and significance level is 
denoted by an asterisk. One asterisk indicates significance at the 10 % level, two asterisks 5 % level and 
three asterisks 1 % level. Further, the statistical results are corrected for heteroscedastisity and potential 
autocorrelation by using robust standard errors.  The regression specifications are also controlled for 
country unobserved effects by using country-dummies in first regression of the two models and differences 
in countries‟ health care systems in two regressions of two models. From the 1 specification in the table 13 
one unit increase in the coefficient hospital competition leads to increase in mortality by 0.183 units. This 
means that one unit increase in hospital competition is associated with an increase in mortality for AMI 
patients by 0.183 units that represent an increase in 18.3 percent in mortality. The mortality increasing 
results from hospital competition in the baseline specification, therefore, does not confirm the improvement 
in quality according to hypothesis 1. However, the hospital competition appears to reduce an increase in 
mortality controlling for outcome of hospital treatment by PTCA and stenting, general practitioners and 
specialized practitioners where the effect represent an insignificant 0.0919 units. This means that hospital 
related characteristics associated with outcome of hospital care have an important reducing effect on the 
rate of mortality. The inclusion of general practitioners reduces mortality rate and shows that an increase in 
one unit is associated with a decrease in hospital mortality by -4.285 points (specification 2). The decrease 
in mortality is significant at 1 percent controlling for the number of hospital beds and discharge rates and 
remain consistently throughout the next 3 specifications. The coefficient for hospital competition is 
statistically distinguished from zero and negative in the specifications 3, 4 and 5.  That is, with one unit 
increase in hospital competition is associated with a decrease in hospital mortality by -0.1945 units 
controlling for hospital beds, discharge rates and -0.187 controlling for gender and age related 
characteristics. Further, the inclusion of controls such as health expenditure as percentage of GDP and OOP 
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expenditure represent -0.109 which is significant at 10 percent level (see table 13). The overall results seem 
to confirm negative association between hospital competition and mortality rate for most specifications, 
ranging between 10 and 19 percentage points.  This means that hospital competition reduces the mortality 
rate by at least 10 percent with the inclusion of health care expenditure as a share of GDP and OOP 
expenditure. That is, the inclusion of health expenditure as a share of GDP is associated with statistically 
insignificant increases in hospital mortality by 12.93 percent and inclusion of OOP expenditure by 4 
percent (see specification 5, Table 13). The two controls influence hospital competition‟s mortality 
reducing effect with 10.9 percent and the coefficient is also significant at 10 percent level. The R-square is 
0.9299 in the specification 1 and 0.9751 in specification 5, suggesting the negative association becomes 
stronger with the addition of hospital related controls. Further, from table 13 one can see that an increase in 
the number of beds by one unit yields a decrease in mortality rate by 19.45 percent which is significant at 1 
percent level (specification 3). An increase in mortality rate controlling for the number of beds can be 
explained by improved health outcomes for patients treated with AMI diagnosis in larger hospitals. In the 
following 5 specifications the coefficient is negative when controlling for age and gender and controlling 
for the type of health care expenditure. The coefficient for hospital competition after the inclusion of the 
number of beds has negative sign which means that hospital competition reduces the mortality rate when 
hospitals have larger size. Next, an increase in the percentage of people at the age of 65 by one units is 
associated with -1.0254 statistically significant reductions in mortality represented by an increased use of 
health care by the elderly and females (specification 4). This indicates that increases in the use of health 
care services by the elderly and females increase pressure on hospitals to improve services when hospital 
competition increases. Expectedly, an increase in health care expenditure as a share of GDP and OOP 
expenditure both reduce the risk of mortality in different hospital markets even if the consumption of health 
care might consequentially decrease when individual have to pay more for additional services consumed. 
Therefore, the coefficient for OOP expenditure represents an increase in mortality even though the 
mortality coefficient is still negative. These results can therefore confirm that controlling for unobserved 
country heterogeneity there is a negative association between hospital quality and hospital competition 
which is in accordance with the hypothesis 1. 
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Table 13. Admissions-based in-hospital mortality and hospital competition. 
 
      
Dependent variable Admissions based in-hospital 30 days mortality rate  
2000-2009 Method OLS     
Independent variables Competition measure    
Specification 1 2 3 4 5 
Number of hospitals      
density per million p. 0,183** 0,09195 -0,1945*** -0,1866*** -0,109* 
 0,077983 0,072692 0,073905 0,060902 0,65465 
PTCA and stenting for 100000 p.  -0,013 -0,01468** -0,003005 -0,003 
  0,004555 0,004116 0,004199 0,0041 
General medical practitioners,  -4,28478*** -5,46294*** -5,00309** -4,8*** 
density per 1000 p.  1,587713 0,777671 0,578582 0,67877 
Specialized medical practitioners,  -1,587713 -1,043665 -0,976556** -0,928** 
density per 1000 p.  1,244284 0,641312 0,44455 0,4169 
Hospital beds, per 100 000 p.   1,95903*** 1,74225*** 1,264*** 
   0,412421 3,46E-01 0,346198 
Discharge rates,   0,000736 1,49E-04 0,000237 
diseases of the circularly per 100 000 p.   0,000875 0,000821 0,00079 
Population over 65 and older,    -1,02542*** -0,95*** 
percentage of total p.    0,242807 0,24965 
Females,    0,506709 0,3266 
percentage of total p.    0,8486 0,83416 
Total health expenditure,     -0,1293 
percentage of GDP     0,15035 
Out-of-pocket health expenditure,     0,0407 
percentage of private health expenditure     0,025 
Country dummies/Australia as a 
reference Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Sample 1123 1123 1123 1123 1123 
Observations 123 123 123 123 123 
R-square 0,927798 0,954375 0,965961 0,973875 0,97508 
S.E 0,959913 0,77442 0,675693 0,598097 0,5902 
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Table 14. Admissions-based in-hospital mortality in percentage and hospital competition for countries 
with a public model of health care system.
17
 
Dependent variable Admissions based in-hospital 30 - days mortality rate  
      
2000-2009 Method OLS     
Independent variables Competition measure    
Specification 1 2 3 4 5 
Number of hospitals      
density per million p. -0,06223 -0,054603 0,04149 -0,01445*** -0,15033*** 
 0,038582 0,034459 0,039478 0,057001 0,031712 
PTCA and stenting for 100000 p.  0,018128*** 0,01515*** 0,01326*** 0,008635*** 
  0,003822 0,00354 0,003827 0,00264 
General medical practitioners,  -4,6368** -2,38637* -1,76936 -1,89865** 
density per 1000 p.  1,87604 1,227875 1,396108 0,84786 
Specialized medical practitioners,  -1,500753 -3,16458** 0,841546 -1,675984 
density per 1000 p.  1,208369 1,224275 1,54226 1,5608 
Hospital beds, per 100 000 p.   -2,8890*** -4,27936*** 2,17134*** 
   0,51883 5,63E-01 0,56395 
Discharge rates,   0,0056*** 0,004854*** -0,000757 
diseases of the circularly per 100 000 p.  0,001113 0,001118 0,000876 
Population over 65 and older,    1,2709*** -0,9117*** 
percentage of total p.    0,309496 0,209304 
Females,    4,7963* -0,017896 
percentage of total p.    2,5249 2,603987 
Total health expenditure,     2,0254*** 
percentage of GDP     0,23546 
Out-of-pocket health expenditure,     0,036946 
percentage of private health expend.     0,03004 
Sample 157 157 157 157 157 
Observations 57 57 57 57 57 
R-square 0,025552 0,296474 0,58695 0,684383 0,925886 
S.E 4,124332 3,604076 2,816255 2,512551 1,24373 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17
 The countries included in the ‘mixed’ model of the health care system are Germany, Holland, Belgium, France, Austria, 
Switzerland, Israel, Japan, CSEE and FSU countries, see also Bjegovic & Donev, 2004. 
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Results for countries in the public model of health care system are presented in the table 14. The 
estimated hospital competition coefficient shows that an increase in hospital competition by one unit is 
associated with a decrease in hospital mortality by -0.062 units (specification 1). Therefore, this result is 
in line with the predictions of the hypothesis 1. Further, the inclusion of controls confirms the decrease in 
mortality from hospital with the exception when capacity controls are specified (specification 3). Thus, 
the size of the hospital has slightly a mortality increasing effect in this regression model from hospital 
competition. Further, the specification 5 represents the largest, that is, 15.03 percent decrease in 
mortality when hospital competition rises controlling for demographics and the type of health care 
expenditure (see specifications 4 and 5). These mortality reducing results from hospital competition 
suggests that the use of health services by females and elderly improve significantly health outcomes, 
especially when health outcomes when health care expenditure is controlled (specification 5). Thus, this 
underlying association between hospital competition and health care quality confirm the hypothesis 1 for 
the public model of health care system and the previous findings. 
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Table 15. Admissions-based in-hospital mortality in percentage and hospital competition from countries with 
mixed model of health care system. 
 
Dependent variable Admissions based in-hospital 30 day mortality rate  
        
2000-2009  Method OLS     
Independent variables Competition measure    
Specification 1 2 3 4 5 
Number of hospitals      
density per million p. -0,0293 0,002811 -0,5417*** -0,13836*** -0,055*** 
   0,019218 0,01839 0,020868 0,017268 0,020375 
PTCA and stenting for 100000p.  0,011826 0,03054*** 0,00818 -0,0150*** 
    0,09559 0,012065 0,009785 0,004811 
General medical practitioners,  -1,042848   -2,56376***   -2,096083*** -1,003641 
density per 1000 p.  0,635506 0,74329 0,448335 0,616701 
Specialized medical practitioners,  1,039044 1,01913 4,3962*** 2,27282* 
density per 1000 p.  0,837649 0,968998 1,55252 1,32387 
Hospital beds, per 100 000 p.   2,388879*** 2,78118*** 2,0858*** 
     0,427098 3,24E-01 0,414032 
Discharge rates,   -0,00355*** -0,001253 -0,00063 
diseases of the circularly per 100 000 p.   0,001106 0,000885 0,000923 
Population over 65 and older,    -1,66178*** -0,8573** 
percentage of total p.    0,268396 0,34552 
Females,    3,19457*** 0,777041 
percentage of total p.    0,55848 0,520965 
Total health expenditure,     1,4494*** 
percentage of GDP     0,267428 
Out-of-pocket health expenditure,     0,048042 
percentage of private health expenditure     0,04201 
Sample 173 173 173 173 173 
Observations 73 73 73 73 73 
R-square 0,018852 0,140294 0,368787 0,756042 0,859268 
S.E 3,7936 3,62859 3,155978 1,992442 1,537511 
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        
18
Countries included in the public models are UK, Ireland, Sweden, Norway, Finland, Denmark, Italy, Spain, 
Portugal, New Zealand, Spain, Canada, Australia, see also (Bjegovic & Donev, 2004). 
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The results for countries in the mixed model of health care system are presented in the table 15.  In the 
specification 1 the estimated hospital competition coefficient is -0.0293 units which mean that one unit 
increase in competition is associated with a decrease in AMI mortality with 2.93 percent. The decrease in 
mortality is, therefore, in line with the previous results. Controlling for PTCA, general practitioners and 
specialized practitioners, the estimated coefficient is positively insignificant, that is, 0.28 percentage points 
(see specification 2). In the next 3 specifications the estimated coefficient for hospital competition is strongly 
negative and statistically significant. That is, one unit increase in hospital competition associated with -0.542 
units decrease in hospital mortality from the inclusion of capacity controls such as hospital beds and number 
of discharge rates (specification 3).  Thus, increases in mortality reductions from hospital competition confirm 
that hospital‟s operational capacity measured in the number of beds have the most significant positive impact 
on the outcome of hospital quality. Namely, the mortality reduction is observed in the specification where 
both the hospital beds and discharge rate are included representing the largest negative effect, that is, 54.2 
percent on hospital mortality. Further, with the inclusion of age and gender characteristics the hospital 
competition‟ negative effect on mortality appear to be considerably reduced and the estimated coefficient now 
represents 13.8 percent from increased use of health care services by elderly and females. The possible 
explanation for this that greater patient health care use results in an increase in mortality although the overall 
effect still remains mortality reducing. The inclusion of health care expenditure as percentage of GDP and 
OOP expenditure increase the coefficient to 5.5 percent decrease in morality (specification 5). This confirms 
the previous results that found support for negative association between mortality and hospital competition 
and hence positive association between hospital competition and outcome of hospital quality. These results 
also confirm previous findings on the mortality reducing effects for acute AMI patients from hospital 
competition and the positive association between quality and hospital competition in the mixed model of 
health care system. Hence, these results also provide no reasons to reject the hypothesis 1. 
 
 
 
6.2   The average length of stay for acute AMI in days and hospital competition 
 
 
The regression results from the hospital competition association with the ALOS are presented in table 16. The 
first regression result indicates that a one unit increase in hospital competition is associated with a decrease in 
the ALOS by -0.00374 units (see specification 1). This means that, with an increase in hospital competition 
one would expect to see a decrease in the excess ALOS. Therefore, a decrease in the ALOS confirms the 
prediction that hospital competition leads to lower excess ALOS when hospital treatments improves in 
efficiency. Furthermore, for most specifications in the regression model the coefficient for hospital 
competition appear to be negative on the ALOS. Thus, the regression results from different specifications 
generally favor positive association between hospital quality and hospital competition. The coefficient for 
hospital competition is also statistically distinguished from zero and generally negative except for when 
controlling for PTCA and stenting, general practitioners and specialized practitioners. In the case of the 
inclusion of PTCA and stenting the ALOS increases that represents an increase in the 1.672 percentage points 
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(specification 2). Thus, the result controlling for the outcome of hospital quality shows that an increase in the 
ALOS undermines the assumption that an improved hospital quality is likely to be possible as a result of 
lower excess ALOS. However, this positive association between hospital competition and the ALOS does not 
hold in the next 3 specifications showing a variation between -2 to - 2.65 statistically significant percentage 
points decrease in the ALOS when hospital competition increases. Hence, the effect of hospital competition 
on quality of hospital care finds larger positive association because hospital competition insures a decrease in 
excess ALOS. 
 
Table 16.  ALOS by acute AMI in days and hospital competition. 
 
ALOS      
   by AMI  (2000-2009)      
Specifications 1 2 3 4 5 
Number of hospitals -0,00374 0,01672** -0,0212** -0,02144* -0,0265** 
Per million population 0,008043 0,008326 0,0109 0,011135 0,012345 
PTCA and stenting for  -0,01447*** -0,01202*** -0,00984*** -0,0099*** 
100 000 population  0,003452 0,003125 0,003052 0,003235 
General medical practition.  -2,179224*** -0,555471 -0,776016 -1,137249 
Density per 1000 pop.  0,626139 0,878549 0,882962 0,727582 
Specialized medical p  -2,167751*** -2,08847*** -1,773874** -1,21178 
Practitioner 1000 pop.  0,698215 0,59871 0,749571 0,757155 
Hospital beds, per   1,74049*** 1,505166*** 1,49169*** 
100 000 population   0,40942 0,400479 0,364084 
Discharge rates, diseases per   0,000265 0,000301 0,000253 
circularly per 100 000 pop.   0,000786 0,000772 0,000716 
Population 65 years old and older    -0,328719 -0,261102 
    0,199279 0,19773 
Females, percentage of total    -1,174494 -0,362544 
population    0,612032 0,601372 
Total health expenditure,     -0,20108 
percentage of GDP     0,12842 
Out-of-pocket health      
expenditures     0,000255 
% of private expenditure     0,00921 
Country Dummies/Australia Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sample 1150 1150 1150 1150 1150 
Observations 150 150 150 150 150 
R-square 0,810639 0,913594 0,934801 0,936618 0,938796 
S.E. 0,916823 0,626477 0,54846 0,545076 0,539963 
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Expectedly, decreases in the ALOS is that hospital competition leads to the reduction in time patients spent 
in hospital beds which is reflected in the negative sign for hospital competition coefficients in the 
specifications 3, 4 and 5. Moreover, as hospital competition reduces the excess ALOS, increasing hospital 
beds, however, yields a statistically significant increase in the ALOS with 1.74 units which mean that in 
larger hospitals there will have longer ALOS.  
However, the inclusion of demographic controls associated with females and elderly, causes hospital‟s 
competition to reduce its impact on the ALOS. That is, one unit increase in the female and elderly is 
associated with a decrease in the ALOS by -0.021 (see specification 4). This result also represents an 
increase in hospital competition‟s negative effect on the ALOS. Thus, a general decrease in the ALOS is 
supportive of the expectation that an increase in the use of health care services by females and elderly is 
leading to a decrease in excess hospital stay. Further, controlling for the health care expenditure an increase 
in the health care expenditures by one unit confirms the previous findings and decreases the ALOS to -
0.0265 (specification 5). However, the health care expenditure with inclusion of OOP shows that one unit 
increase in the private health expenditure is associated with an insignificant increase in ALOS to 0.0002 
while the control‟s impact on the hospital competition remains negative. This means that the inclusion of 
OOP expenditure by one unit tends to increase the ALOS by -0.0265 when hospital competition rises 
(specification 5). This finding can be explained by that patients‟ propensity to pay contributes to lower 
excess ALOS in a model controlling for unobserved country heterogeneity. Thus, the overall results appear 
to favor the assumption of hypothesis 2 for the reduced excess ALOS. 
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Table 17.  ALOS by acute AMI and hospital competition for countries with public model of health care 
system. 
ALOS by acute AMI      
      
Specifications  1  2      3    4    5 
Number of hospitals 0,04677*** 0,0329** -0,0269*** -0,0244*** -0,0285*** 
Per million population 0,016505 0,01494 0,00517 0,004779 0,004747 
PTCA and stenting for  -0,029*** -0,0342*** -0,0304*** -0,0191*** 
100 000 population  0,001967 0,00213 0,002654 0,00403 
General medical practitioners  0,035207 -4,0357***  -0,4077*** -0,8587*** 
Density per 1000 pop.  0,16053 0,12863 0,14204 0,184502 
Specialized medical p  0,384392 -0,4955** -0,66046** 0,323297 
Practitioner 1000 pops.  0,257971 0,219833 0,31632 0,43771 
Hospital beds, per   0,6789*** 0,7711*** 1,2437*** 
100 000 population   0,183801 0,176813 0,248422 
Discharge rates, diseases per   0,00126*** 0,00097*** -6,49E-05 
circularly per 100 000 p.   0,000297 0,000298 0,00048 
Population 65 years old and      
older    -0,00125 -0,2975*** 
    0,0605 0,105436 
Females, percentage of total    0,5498** 1,3285*** 
Population    0,225806 0,28425 
Total health expenditure,     -0,2547*** 
percentage of GDP     0,057994 
Out-of-pocket health expenditures    0,012328 
% of private expenditure     0,007876 
Sample 187 187 187 187 187 
Observations 87 87 87 87 87 
R-square 0,140867 0,633614 0,91993 0,924932 0,937201 
S.E 2,1028 1,39811 0,661709 0,648869 0,60124 
      
 
 
 
 
The table 17 presents the results for the ALOS by acute AMI patients and hospital competition for 
countries included in the public model of health care system. From the specification 1 one unit increase in 
hospital competition is associated with an increase in the ALOS by 0.046 units. The result represents 4.6 
percent rise and remains positively and statistically significant with the inclusion of controls associated 
with the outcome of hospital care such as PTCA and stenting, general and specialized practitioners (see 
specification 2). This means that, positive association of the first two specifications does not favor the 
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hypothesis 2 although the model does not have a good fit with R-square in the first two specifications being 
0.14 and 0.633 respectively. Considering the specification 3, the model‟s R-squire is 0.91 with the 
inclusion of controls associated with hospital capacity such as hospital beds and discharge rates. The 
estimated coefficient of hospital competition in this regression also finds stronger negative association 
between ALOS and hospital competition. This means that with an increase in hospital competition 
controlling both the hospital beds and discharge rates the coefficient finds support for the reduced ALOS 
with -0.0269 units. Moreover, the association between hospital competition and ALOS remains negative in 
the specifications 3, 4 and 5, controlling for gender, demographic characteristics and health care 
expenditures. This means that as the results in different specifications vary but the negative association is 
somewhat stronger between hospital competition and ALOS. Thus, the positive relation between quality of 
care and hospital competition in the public model seems to be stronger. The association between hospital 
competition and the ALOS is negative in latter 3 specifications and positive in first 2 specifications. 
Therefore, as the model increase in the number of control variables the results found in the latter 3 
specifications indicate positive relation in the public model. These findings also confirm the results found 
in the regression model for unobserved country heterogeneity and support the hypothesis 2. 
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Table 18. ALOS by acute AMI and hospital competition for countries with mixed model of health care 
system. 
 
. 
ALOS      
by acute AMI      
Dependent variables: 1 2 3 4 5 
Number of hospitals 0,08785*** 0,0882*** 0,0541** 0,04448* 0,0714*** 
Per million population 0,014433 0,014127 0,02331 0,02496 0,018363 
PTCA and stenting for  0,00029 -0,00045 -0,00171 -0,001388 
100 000 p.  0,000291 0,001082 0,001734 0,001229 
General medical practitioners  1,2598** 1,0897** 0,84364 -0,541056 
Density per 1000 pop.  0,51668 0,4674 0,593596 0,693132 
Specialized medical p  -1,197** -0,321887 -0,2738 -0,503765 
Practitioner 1000 pops.  0,519249 0,743487 0,68734 0,737537 
Hospital beds, per   0,4200** 0,46735* 0,49486*** 
100 000 p.   0,20791 0,268443 0,186258 
Discharge rates, diseases per   -0,000332 -0,00016 0,000517 
circularly per 100 000 p.   0,000255 0,000354 0,000406 
Population 65 years old and      
older    0,090698 0,1519*** 
    0,072863 0,057908 
Females, percentage of total    -0,66671 -2,093* 
Population    1,0906 1,07662 
Total health expenditure,     -0,3415*** 
percentage of GDP     0,06037 
Out-of-pocket health expenditures     -0,0269*** 
% of private expenditure     0,00781 
Country Dummies/Australia                 
Sample 174 174 174 174 174 
Observations 74 74 74 74 74 
R-square 0,336957 0,61699 0,65978 0,66914 0,776883 
S.E 0,014433 1,109102 1,0608 1,06208 0,885909 
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The table 18 shows the regression results for the ALOS and hospital competition for countries with mixed 
model of health care system.  From the specification 1 one unit increase in hospital competition is 
associated with an increase in the ALOS by 0.087 units. That is, it represents 8.7 percent increase in the 
ALOS when hospital competition increases which is notable because the regression model suddenly finds a 
positive association between ALOS and hospital competition. Therefore, the assumption of the hypothesis 
2 is generally undermined in this regression model.  In the specification 2 the inclusion of general and 
specialized practitioners is associated with an increase in the ALOS with 0.0882 units from an increase in 
hospital competition while the impact from the specialized practitioners on the ALOS is expectedly 
negative. The positive relation is henceforth confirmed in the next 3 specifications. Next, the inclusion of 
discharge rates reduces the hospital competitions‟ increasing effect on the ALOS from 8 to 5 percent and 
contributes to overall picture of generally higher ALOS from increased hospital competition (see 
specification 3). Furthermore, the effect becomes even smaller, that is, 4.4 percent when demographic 
variables are controlled (specification 4). Health care expenditure controls increase hospital competitions‟ 
effect on ALOS further by 7.14 percent (specification 5). At the same time, the coefficients of health care 
expenditure as a share of GDP and OOP expenditures themselves remain negative. That means they reduce 
ALOS due to increases in hospital competition. Namely, one unit increase in the health expenditures 
represent reduction in the ALOS by -0.3415 and - 0.0269 units irrespective of whether hospital competition 
has an increasing impact on the ALOS, that is 7.14 percent rise. Thus, in the mixed model of health care 
system findings do not confirm previous regression results and reject the hypothesis 2.  
 
6.2 Summary  
 
The chapter has reviewed the regression results for hospital competition‟s effect on the two quality 
measures used in two different models. The underlying finding indicates that hospital competition tends to 
decrease mortality rate for acute AMI patients in both models in general although the results from different 
specifications vary. The result is statistically significant and varies between -2 and 20 percentage points‟ 
decrease from an increase in hospital competition.  Specifically, these results apply for countries in a 
regression model that uses country dummies as well as regressions with public and mixed models, 
confirming the hypothesis 1. Concerning the use of health care services, the ALOS for acute AMI patients 
shows less consistent results with regard to the sign of the coefficient for hospital competition. For 
instance, using the country dummies the results confirm that hospital competition decreases the ALOS 
which also generally applies for the countries in the public model. For countries included in the public 
model the specification including the number of hospital beds and discharge rates has the most significant 
impact on this relation as it changes the sign of hospital competition coefficient from positive to negative. 
Mortality reductions results from hospital competition mean that hospital capacity determined by the initial 
hospital‟s size has most sensitive positive impact on the outcome on hospital quality. That is, hospital 
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competition is able to reduce the excess ALOS when hospitals are able to utilize their services in the 
context of larger operational capacity. However, concerning the regression of the mixed model of health 
care system the results undermine the assumptions of the hypothesis 2 and reflect instead that an increase in 
hospital competition leads to an increase in the ALOS. 
 
 
 
7.  Conclusions 
 
The aim of this thesis was to contribute to the understanding of whether the relationship between hospital 
competition and health care quality is positive and to determine to what extent hospital competition 
influences the quality of hospital services. Theory suggests that hospital competition is likely to improve 
quality when hospitals able to maximize both the quantity and quality domains of their services by insuring 
better utilization of services in regards to operational capacity, the outcome of hospital treatments and 
system related financial incentives. The difference between this thesis and other related studies of the 
regional research is captured by the two main factors. Firstly, few have looked at the heterogeneity in 
hospital market development in the setting of the international study by accounting for unobserved country 
characteristics. Secondly, this paper involves the use of different health care systems in a model where 
hospital competition is limited due to prevalence of public hospital providers and in a model where hospital 
competition is influenced by private health insurance. This allows capturing the levels of reimbursements 
in the public and private providers of both models. In doing so a density measure of hospital competition 
was adopted that is distinctly different from the HHIs as market share measures that were overwhelmingly 
used in regional research. Finally, the study approached AMI mortality measure as the outcome based 
measure and ALOS as the utilization based measures. The AMI mortality reflects hospital‟s internal 
failures whereas the ALOS has allowed measuring health care use as a source that may contribute to lower 
excess capacity in the process of health care quality improvement. These measures used together, while 
generally applicable to the regional research, offered more nuanced portrayal of the possible positive 
quality impact from hospital competition in different hospital markets. Moreover, the general findings of 
this study are in line with many studies at the regional level that found the positive association between 
hospital competition and quality of care. That is, the results generally found support for mortality reduction 
and reductions in the excess capacity from lower ALOS for acute AMI patients owed to increases in 
hospital competition.  
 
The two hypotheses are presented in the study. The results support hypothesis 1 which states that hospital 
competition aids in positive outcome of health care quality when the amount of hospital services consumed 
increase for patients. Furthermore, the results favor hypothesis 2 (except for when ALOS used as quality 
measure in the mixed model) that states that hospital excess capacity is likely to be reduced when hospitals 
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are able to identify priorities in the utilization of health care services by offering better treatments. So for 
instance, for admissions-based AMI mortality rate the results showed a tendency to a decreased mortality 
when hospital competition increases in most specifications with the exception of the first specification, 
presumably due to the incoherent aggregate effect on health care quality represented by the proxy for 
hospital competition itself. 
 
In general, the control variables behave in line with the theoretical expectations. The regression results 
showed that hospital competition has the tendency to decrease the mortality rate and that is confirmed with 
the inclusion of controls associated with operational capacity such as the number of hospital beds and 
discharge rates. These controls are seemingly affecting the behavior of controls associated with 
demographic characteristics and the type of health care expenditure. Moreover, mortality reducing effects 
from hospital competition provides support for the hypothesis 1 even though inclusion of controls 
associated with the type of health care expenditure diminishes the mortality reducing effect from the 
measure of hospital competition. In this case, a slight increase in mortality are in line with the theoretical 
prediction that as individuals increase their private expenditure on health care there will be a tendency to be 
reluctant to use services when they have to pay more for additional services consumed. Thus, larger OOP 
has a reducing effect on the proxy for hospital competition‟s effect on mortality.  
 
Using the ALOS for acute AMI patients as an indicator of qualitative health care use shows that the 
hospital competition leads to generally statistically significant decreases in the ALOS. That is, the ALOS is 
negatively associated with hospital competition at approximately 2 percent rate. Therefore, the hospital 
competition relation with hospital quality has a tendency to be positive. However, the regression results for 
both the public model and mixed models underscore different relational tendencies. For example in the 
public model, an increase in hospital competition generally leads to a decrease in excess ALOS at 
approximately -2.4 to -2.8 percentage points. Expectedly, this finding provides no reasons to reject the 
hypothesis 2 that views hospital quality improvements to come as a result of lower excess ALOS when 
hospitals offer better health care services for patients. Thus, for the public model of health care system 
hospital competition reduces the ALOS influenced by improved hospital‟s operational capacity measured 
both in number of hospital beds and discharge rates that confirm the assumptions of the hypothesis 2. The 
implication of the finding for countries in the public health care model provides reasons to believe that 
hospitals will see largest reducing impact on the ALOS with an increase in the availability of hospital beds 
for countries with predominantly public hospital providers. The reductions in the ALOS are also likely to 
mirror improved hospital performance which is established as a result of improved use of hospitals 
services. Moreover, the result for the public model is an indication that countries with higher share of 
public providers‟ will manage to reduce the ALOS when hospitals also have larger size.  
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In the mixed model of health care system an increase in the hospital competition leads to an increase in the 
ALOS, which indicates it worsens quality of care according to the hypothesis 2. This means that the effect 
of hospital competition of quality of care is statistically distinguished and positively correlated across all 
specifications that represent an increase in the ALOS by 4.5-8.7 percentage points when hospital 
performance improves. There are two possible explanations that the result that does not generally support 
hospital competition for countries in mixed model of healthcare system. One explanation is that the 
countries are less responsive to the effect of hospital competition on health care quality due to presumably 
already well developed framework for hospital performance. The second explanation is that as a result of 
the increase in the additional efforts to sustain the scope of hospital competition may lead to the opposite 
effect than what is initially anticipated. Consequentially, when hospital competition increases the effect on 
quality will be lower at the margin for countries in this model of health care system which contradicts the 
initial expectation that with greater share of private providers would be better for hospital quality 
improvements in the context of OECD health policies for public-private partnerships. Possibilities for 
future studies should definitely explore some of the underlying mechanisms that point to the differences 
between public models and mixed model so that reasons for different effects from hospital competition can 
be further assessed. Another interesting area for future research is to delve deeper into institutional factors 
as well as health system related factors that influence the quality of hospital services and thus contribute to 
the comprehensive knowledge of the sources that may be at play for these different effects.   
 
7.1 Suggestions for future policies 
 
The results of this study provide robust and positive association between hospital competition and the 
outcome of hospital quality in the framework of reduction of mortality rate for AMI patients. This means 
that as far as future policies are concerned the health care policy could aim to improve hospital 
performance in the context of outcome of hospital care associated with hospital treatments to decrease 
mortality for acute diseases. Moreover, in the context of continued promotion of health care policy reforms 
to ensure better hospital performance in the OECD framework may help to establish mortality reductions 
particularly for hospitals that deliver greater quantity of hospital care. Therefore, the promotion of health 
care reforms that affect the outcome of hospital mortality would presumably give larger effect on the 
reduction in the excess hospital capacity for larger public hospitals in the public and mixed models of 
health care systems.  
 
Results for the quality measure ALOS for acute AMI patients also, in principle, confirm the theoretical 
argument that an increase in the hospital competition increases the likelihood of improved quality for 
countries in the model controlling for unobserved country heterogeneity as well as the public model of 
health care system. However, this is not the case for countries in mixed model where there is opposite 
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relationship between hospital competition and ALOS is established judging by results of the data. The latter 
findings challenge the view that private hospital market development should be considered as a benchmark 
for public hospital policy promotion in establishing greater hospital competition. Thus, as far as future 
policies are concerned, governments in the OECD may not be entirely convinced to follow the direction of 
private hospital providers for future quality improvement in mixed model of health care system. However, 
the ALOS reducing effects are partially found for countries included in the public model it confirms 
reasons behind the current reformations of hospitals in the public sector. Thus, this international study 
believes that the policies for continued reduction in the excess hospital capacity are justified in the public 
model confirmed by the hypothesis and results of the study.  
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Appendix: 
 
 
Table 4. In-patient PTCA and stenting for 100 000 population. 
 
Country 
Australia 144.57
a
 
Austria 182.86
a
 
Belgium 460.675
f
 
Canada 133.6
b
 
Czech  
Republic 203.17
e
 
Finland 116.89
a
 
Germany 542.58
e
 
Ireland 72.3
a
 
Israel 231.91
a
 
Italy 128.25
f
 
Netherlands 134.84
c
 
New Zeeland 107.4
e
 
Norway 23.9
d
 
Poland 64.44
d
 
Portugal 80.86
a
 
Spain 83.92
a
 
Switzerland 100.485
a
 
USA 212.55
a
 
Sweden 162.02
a
 
Source: OECD health data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a
2000-2009   
f
2006-2009 
b
2001-2008 
e
2004-2009 
c
2001-2009 
d
2002-2009
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Table 5.  General medical practitioners per 1000 of the population. 
 
Country 
 Australia 1.428
a1
 
Austria 1.461
a1
 
Belgium 1.1575
e2
 
Canada 1.0311
a1
 
Czech Republic 0.715
d3
 
Finland 1.0165
a1
 
Germany 1,48333
d
 
Israel 0.7325
a1
 
Italy 0.94
e2
 
Netherlands 1.205555
b4
 
New Zeeland 0.795
d
 
Norway 1.87875
c5
 
Poland 0.445
c5
 
Portugal 1.684
a1
 
Spain 0.7245
a1
 
Switzerland 0.505
a1
 
USA 0.301
a1
 
Source: OECD health statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
a1 
2000-2009 
e2 
2006-2009 
d2 
2004-2009 
b2 
2001-2009 
c3 
2002-2009 
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Table 6.  Number of specialized practitioners per 1000 population. 
 
 
Country 
Australia 1.242
a
 
Austria 2.082
a
 
Belgium 1.71
f
 
Canada 1.12
b
 
Czech  
Republic 2.7133
e
 
Finland 1.426
a
 
Germany 2.01
e
 
Ireland 0.7255
a
 
Israel 2.2695
a
 
Italy 2,73
f
 
Netherlands 1,5089
c
 
New Zeeland 1.235
e
 
Norway 1.5075
d
 
Poland 1.72
d
 
Portugal 1,797
a
 
Spain 2.1575
a
 
Switzerland 2.335
a
 
USA 2.091
a
 
Sweden 1.9514
a
 
Source: OECD health data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a
2000-2009 
f
 2006-2009 
b
2000-2008 
e
2004-2009 
c 
2001-2008 
d
2002-2009
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Table 7. Hospital beds per 100 000 inhabitants.  
Country 
 Australia 3.882
a6
 
Austria 7.751
a6
 
Belgium 6.6025
f7
 
Canada 3.42555
b8
 
Czech Repubic 7.37
e9
 
Finland 7.025
a6
 
Germany 8.34
e9
 
Ireland 5.316
a6
 
Israel 3.778
a6
 
Italy 3.785
f7
 
Luxemburg 5.7566
e9
 
Netherlands 4.6322
c10
 
New Zeeland 1.6067
e9
 
Norway 3.93625
d11
 
Poland 6.59
d11
 
Portugal 3.528
a6
 
Spain 3.404
a6
 
Sweden 3.029
a6
 
Switzerland 5.637
a6
 
USA 3.265
a6
 
Source: OECD health data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
a6
2000-2009 
f7
 2006-2009 
b8
 2001-2009 
e9 
2004-2009 
c10
2000-2008 
d11
2002-2009 
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Table 8.  Hospital discharge rates by disease of the circularly, 
per 100 000 population. 
Country 
 Australia 1670.4
a12
 
Austria 3407.01
b13
 
Belgium 2100.25
f14
 
Canada 1181.533
c15
 
Czech Republic 2854.2
e17
 
Finland 3150.13
a12
 
Germany 3400.2
g16
 
Ireland 1297.34
a12
 
Israel 1598.45
a12
 
Italy 2097.85
f14
 
Japan 1331.975
g16
 
Luxemburg 2213.45
e17
 
Netherlands 1473.83
b13
 
New Zeeland 1396
e17
 
Norway 2449.275
d18
 
Poland 2566.24
d18
 
Portugal 1196.6
a12
 
Spain 1334.94
a12
 
Sweden 2427.45
a12
 
Switzerland 1694.28
a12
 
USA 2045.44
a12
 
Source: OECD health data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
a12
2000-2009  
b13
 2000-2008  
f14
 2006-2009 
c15
 2001-2009 
g16
 2007-2009 
e17
 2004-2009 
d18
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Table 9. Percentage of elderly at the age of 65 or older, 
percentage of total population. 
Country 
 Australia 12.86
a19
 
Austria 16.22
a19
 
Belgium 17.125
f20
 
Canada 13.1778
b21
 
Czech Republic 14.43
e22
 
Finland 15.83
a19
 
Germany 19.55
e22
 
Ireland 11.07
a19
 
Israel 9.84
a19
 
Italy 16.02
f20
 
Japan 22.1
g23
 
Luxemburg 14.033
e22
 
Netherlands 14.077
d24
 
New Zeeland 12.333
e22
 
Norway 14.7375
c25
 
Poland 13.2125
c25
 
Portugal 16.97
a19
 
Spain 17.36
a19
 
Sweden 17.36
a19
 
Switzerland 15.99
a19
 
USA 12.53
a19
 
Source: OECD health data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
a19
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f20
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b21
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g23
 2007-2009 
d24
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c25
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Table 10. Percentage of females.  
Country 
 Australia 50.33a26 
Austria 51.43
a26
 
Belgium 51.025
f27
 
Canada 50.4555
b28
 
Czech Republic 51.1167
e29
 
Finland 51.08
a26
 
Germany 51.05
e29
 
Ireland 50.2
a26
 
Israel 50.63
a26
 
Italy 51.425
f27
 
Netherlands 50.5222
c30
 
New Zeeland 51.0167
e29
 
Norway 50.3125
d31
 
Poland 51.65
d31
 
Portugal  51.63
a26
 
Spain 50.8
a26
 
Switzerland 51.03
a26
 
USA 50.76
a26
 
 
Source: OECD health data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
a26 
2000-2009  
f27 
2006-2009 
b28 
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e29 
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c30 
2001-2009 
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Table 11. Total health expenditure as a percentage of GDP. 
 
Country  
Australia 8.45234
a
 
Austria 10.3555
a
 
Belgium 9.9612
g
 
Canada 9.9662
b
 
Czech Republic 6.9776
f
 
Finland 8.10953
a
 
Germany 10.83
f
 
Ireland 7.63396
a
 
Israel 7.7482
a
 
Italy 8.9545
g
 
Netherlands 9.585
c
 
New Zeeland 8.833
f
 
Norway 9.26
d
 
Poland 6.4545
d
 
Portugal 9.905
a
 
Spain 8.172
a
 
Switzerland 10.89
a
 
USA 15.6777
a
 
Sweden 9.2143
e
 
Source: OECD health data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a
2000-2009 
g
2006-2009 
b
2000-2008 
f
2004-2009 
c
2001-2009 
d
2002-2009 
e
2003-2009 
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Table 12. Out-of-pocket expenditure as a share of private health 
expenditure. 
 
Country  
Australia 58.59
a
 
Austria 65.93
a
 
Belgium 78.95
e
 
Canada 50.644
a
 
Czech Republic 88.983
d
 
Finland 76.96
a
 
Germany 56.4667
d
 
Ireland 62.06
a
 
Israel 73.04
a
 
Italy 86.725
e
 
Netherlands 29.3111
b
 
New Zeeland 68.3
d
 
Norway 96.85
c
 
Poland 85.975
c
 
Portugal 79.97
a
 
Spain 78.11
a
 
Switzerland 75.19
a
 
USA 35.86
a
 
 
Source: World 
Bank  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a
2000-2009 
e
2006-2009 
d
2004-2009 
b
2001-2009 
c
2002-2009
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Figure 2. Out of pocket expenditure as a share of private health expenditure. 
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